Ordered that the order is reversed, without costs or disbursements, and the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
It is well settled that in order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a movant must clearly demonstrate (1) the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a granting of the preliminary injunction, and (3) a balancing of the equities in the movant's favor (see, e.g., Doe v Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748; Doe v Poe, 189 A.D.2d 132). A preliminary injunction should not be granted, absent extraordinary circumstances, if the status quo would be disturbed and the plaintiff would thereby receive the ultimate relief requested (see, Bachman v Harrington, 184 N.Y. 458, 464; Rosa Hair Stylists v Jaber Food Corp., 218 A.D.2d 793; Morgan v New York Racing Assn., 72 A.D.2d 740, 741; Ash v Holdeman, 5 A.D.2d 1017, 1018). When, as here, there are sharply contested issues of fact that can only be determined at trial, the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their heavy burden of proving a clear right to preliminary injunctive relief, which, in effect, would grant the plaintiffs the ultimate relief that they request (see, Merrill Lynch Realty Assocs. v Burr, 140 A.D.2d 589, 593; Zurich Depository Corp. v Gilenson, 121 A.D.2d 443; Family Affair Haircutters v Detling, 110 A.D.2d 745). Balletta, J.P., Ritter, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.