Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The record supports the finding that the one-day delay beyond the 90-day time period to serve a notice of claim on behalf of the infant petitioner resulted from the infant's on-going treatment for serious injuries and her parent's concern for the child's condition (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e [a]; Matter of Holmes v New York City Hous. Auth., 201 A.D.2d 650; Matter of Brown v New York City Hous. Auth., 194 A.D.2d 667). The decision to grant the petitioners' application under General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) was within the court's discretion inasmuch as the application was made within the one year and 90-day period of limitations imposed by General Municipal Law § 50-i (1) (c). Considering the overall circumstances, including the minimal delay in serving the notice of claim and the lack of substantial prejudice to the appellants as a result of the delay, the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim on behalf of the infant petitioner was not an improvident exercise of discretion (see, Matter of Holmes v New York City Hous. Auth., supra). Balletta, J.P., Thompson, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.