Judgment unanimously affirmed with costs to plaintiff. Memorandum: We conclude, albeit for different reasons, that Supreme Court properly granted the petition and directed respondent to provide petitioner with General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits. Because the Comptroller granted petitioner's application for performance of duty disability retirement, it was improper for respondent to deny the application of petitioner for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) on the ground that he was not permanently disabled as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of Cook v City of Utica, 216 A.D.2d 944, lv granted 86 N.Y.2d 710; Matter of Putnam v City of Watertown, 213 A.D.2d 974; Matter of Dembowski v La Polla, 213 A.D.2d 972, lv dismissed 86 N.Y.2d 855; Matter of Pidel v City of Yonkers, 208 A.D.2d 845, 847, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 812). Furthermore, the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Board in favor of petitioner precluded respondent from denying General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) benefits on the ground that petitioner was not injured as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 A.D.2d 938; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 A.D.2d 668; Matter of Maresco v Rozzi, 162 A.D.2d 534; Matter of Crawford v Sheriff's Dept., 152 A.D.2d 382, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 704). The ruling of the Workers' Compensation Board, however, is not a basis for determining that petitioner is entitled to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) benefits because it does not necessarily determine that petitioner is permanently disabled as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter.