Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the appellants by service of a summons and complaint upon the Secretary of State pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale against the appellants upon their default in answering the complaint. The appellants now seek vacatur of the judgment of foreclosure and sale, claiming that they never received a copy of the summons and complaint from the Secretary of State.
It is uncontroverted that the appellants did not receive notice of the summons and complaint in time to defend the action. However, we conclude that the appellants have failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's foreclosure action as required by CPLR 317 (see generally, Eugene DiLorenzo, Inc. v Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138; Tonawanda Tank Transp. Serv. v Envirosure Mgt. Corp., 179 A.D.2d 1014; Henniger v L.B.X. Excavating, 176 A.D.2d 917; Epstein v Abalene Pest Control Serv., 98 A.D.2d 832). Thus, the Supreme Court properly determined that the appellants are not entitled to vacatur of the judgment of foreclosure and sale dated January 7, 1994. Bracken, J.P., Altman, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.