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Docket Number

A95A2081

Attorney(S)

Conrad Abernathy, Michael C. Chisolm, for appellant. Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Margaret E. Daly, Kelly C. Crisp, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Judges

RUFFIN, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Stephenson v. The State, A95A2081 (Ct. App. Ga., Feb. 6, 1996)

Factual and Procedural Background

Charles Stephenson, along with co-defendants Renee Humphries, Matthew Rider, and Michael Hyatt, was indicted on two counts of burglary in Cherokee Superior Court. Following a jury trial before Judge Gault, Stephenson was convicted on both counts. He appealed his judgment of conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The opinion was authored by Judge Ruffin and the judgment was affirmed.

The record reflects testimonial facts presented at trial: Humphries testified that Stephenson needed money to purchase a new car and that she, Stephenson, Hyatt, and Rider drove around looking for residences to rob, including the two residences ultimately burglarized. Humphries testified that she and Stephenson entered two homes and took guns and jewelry. Hyatt and Rider corroborated accounts that the group surveyed residences, and that afterwards Stephenson assisted Hyatt and Rider in removing diamonds from some stolen jewelry. Rider testified Stephenson said the jewelry came from a home Stephenson and Humphries had robbed. Stephenson admitted he was present when diamonds were removed, accompanied the others to a pawn shop to sell stolen items, and received $2,800 from Humphries (which he used to purchase a car on the same day).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Stephenson's motion for a continuance where his attorney was appointed 12 days before trial and Stephenson asserted inadequate time to confer with counsel.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a similar transaction (including Stephenson's prior burglary conviction) on the ground that its prejudicial effect outweighed its relevance.
Whether the evidence was legally insufficient to support Stephenson's convictions because, aside from Humphries's testimony, there was no evidence that Stephenson made an unauthorized entry and because Humphries was an accomplice whose uncorroborated testimony alone would be insufficient to convict.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Stephenson's) Arguments

Stephenson contended the trial court erred by denying a continuance because he had inadequate time to confer with his newly appointed counsel (counsel was appointed 12 days before trial).
He argued the admission of evidence of a similar transaction (including his prior burglary conviction) was erroneous because the prejudicial effect of that prior conviction outweighed its probative value.
He maintained the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because, aside from Humphries's testimony, there was no evidence he made an unauthorized entry, and an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to convict.

Appellee's (State's) Arguments

The State argued the similar transaction evidence was relevant to show Stephenson's intent, course of conduct, motive, and scheme in committing the burglaries at issue.
The State presented testimonial evidence (Humphries, Hyatt, Rider) and Stephenson's admissions about presence during removal of diamonds and participation in pawning stolen items to corroborate Humphries's testimony and to support sufficiency of the evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bennett v. State, 186 Ga. App. 832 (368 S.E.2d 789) (1988)	Standards for denying a continuance and review for abuse of discretion.	Cited in support of the conclusion that, under the circumstances (counsel appointed 12 days prior but prepared and ready), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.
Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991)	Admissibility of similar transaction evidence to show intent, course of conduct, motive, and scheme.	Quoted for the proposition that proof of a former crime with marked similarities is relevant to issues such as intent and scheme; supported admission of similar transaction evidence here.
Ramirez v. State, 217 Ga. App. 120, 123 (456 S.E.2d 657) (1995)	Balancing prejudice versus probative value for similar transaction evidence and the limiting instruction's significance.	Used to support the conclusion that any prejudice from admitting prior acts was outweighed by relevance, particularly given limiting jury instructions.
Tucker v. State, 205 Ga. App. 683 (423 S.E.2d 422) (1992)	Rule that a defendant cannot be convicted solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, but slight corroboration from an extraneous source suffices.	Cited to explain that slight corroboration is sufficient to uphold a conviction based on accomplice testimony.
Bradford v. State, 262 Ga. 512 (421 S.E.2d 523) (1992)	Legal sufficiency when slight corroboration supports accomplice testimony.	Applied to conclude that even slight corroboration connecting Stephenson to the burglaries would be legally sufficient.
Earl v. State, 214 Ga. App. 891, 892 (449 S.E.2d 361) (1994)	Corroboration may be circumstantial; presence, companionship, conduct before and after the offense can provide corroboration.	Relied on to explain that circumstantial evidence (presence, companionship, conduct) may corroborate accomplice testimony in this case.
Cain v. State, 212 Ga. App. 531 (442 S.E.2d 279) (1994)	An accomplice's testimony may be corroborated by the testimony of another accomplice.	Invoked to support the proposition that Humphries's testimony could be corroborated by Hyatt's and Rider's testimony in material parts.
Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434 (1973)	Precedent supporting conviction where accomplice testimony is corroborated by other evidence or accomplices.	Used to support the court's conclusion that the jury could believe the corroborated accomplice testimony that Stephenson entered the homes.
Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416 (260 S.E.2d 374) (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ga. App. 786 (287 S.E.2d 120) (1982)	Support for reliance on corroborated accomplice testimony (historical citation).	Cited as additional authority indicating a jury may credit an accomplice's testimony when corroborated by others.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)	Standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction (whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).	Invoked to affirm that the evidence in this case was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis is organized by the three principal contentions raised on appeal:

1. Continuance

The court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Stephenson's motion for a continuance after counsel was appointed 12 days prior to trial. The appointed attorney moved for a continuance but informed the court she had spent substantial time preparing and felt ready to proceed. When asked whether there were un-interviewed witnesses, counsel acknowledged one but stated that lack of that interview would not be problematic. Given these factual representations, the Court of Appeals concluded there was no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance and cited Bennett v. State in support of that conclusion.

2. Admission of Similar Transaction Evidence

The court considered whether admission of evidence of a similar prior burglary (and related convictions) was unduly prejudicial. The court found that the State demonstrated marked similarities between the prior burglary and the charged burglaries at the similar transaction hearing. The State had argued, and the court accepted, that the prior conduct was relevant to show Stephenson's intent, course of conduct, motive, and scheme. Applying the balancing principles reflected in Williams v. State and Ramirez v. State, the court held that any prejudice was outweighed by probative value, especially in light of limiting instructions given to the jury about the narrow purpose for which the evidence could be considered.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony)

Stephenson argued that, except for Humphries's testimony, there was no evidence he made an unauthorized entry and that an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony cannot sustain a conviction. The court reviewed governing precedents that an accomplice's testimony must be corroborated but that the corroboration required may be slight and may be circumstantial. Citing Tucker, Bradford, and Earl, the court explained that slight corroboration from an extraneous source and circumstantial indicators (presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense) suffice.

The court then catalogued the supporting evidence: Humphries's testimony about planning the burglaries with Stephenson; corroboration of that planning and the surveying of residences by Hyatt and Rider; testimony that Stephenson assisted in removing diamonds from stolen jewelry; Rider's testimony that Stephenson identified the source of the jewelry; Stephenson's admission of presence during the removal and attendance at pawn shops; and the fact that Stephenson received $2,800 from Humphries which he used to purchase a car. The court also cited Cain, Pitts, and Wells for the proposition that one accomplice's testimony can be corroborated by another accomplice.

On this basis, applying Jackson v. Virginia's standard, the court concluded the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Stephenson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed Stephenson's convictions on both counts of burglary and affirmed the denial of his motion for a new trial.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to leave Stephenson's convictions and the trial court's denial of a continuance and motion for new trial intact. The opinion applies established Georgia authority on continuances, admissibility of similar transaction evidence, and the corroboration required for accomplice testimony; it does not purport to announce a new legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts of this case.

Judge Ruffin authored the opinion; Chief Judge Beasley and Presiding Judge Pope concurred.

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STEPHENSON v. THE STATE

RUFFIN, Judge.

Charles Stephenson, Renee Humphries, Matthew Rider, and Michael Hyatt were indicted on two counts of burglary. Following a jury trial, Stephenson was convicted on both counts. He appeals his judgment of conviction and the denial of his motion for new trial. For reasons which follow, we affirm.

1. Stephenson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance because he had inadequate time to confer with his attorney in the time between her appointment and the commencement of trial. The transcript shows that Stephenson's attorney was appointed 12 days prior to trial. Although the attorney moved for a continuance on Stephenson's behalf, she stated to the court that "at this time . . . I have spent a great deal of time preparing for this case, and I feel ready to go forward with it if the Court so rules." When asked by the court whether there were any witnesses she had been unable to interview, Stephenson's attorney responded yes, but stated that she did not feel it would be a problem if she did not have the opportunity to interview that particular witness. Given these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion. Bennett v. State, 186 Ga. App. 832 (2) ( 368 S.E.2d 789) (1988).

2. In two enumerations of error, Stephenson contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a similar transaction because the prejudicial effect of his prior burglary conviction outweighed its relevance. We disagree.

Given the marked similarities the State demonstrated between the burglaries at the similar transaction hearing, proof of the former crime was, as the State argued, relevant to show Stephenson's intent, course of conduct, motive, and scheme in committing the burglaries committed in the instant case. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 ( 409 S.E.2d 649) (1991). Thus, "any prejudice which may have resulted from admission into evidence of [Stephenson's] prior criminal acts was outweighed by its relevance." Ramirez v. State, 217 Ga. App. 120, 123 (2) ( 456 S.E.2d 657) (1995). This is particularly true given the court's instructions to the jury concerning the limited purpose of the similar transaction evidence. Id.

3. Stephenson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Stephenson argues that with the exception of Humphries's testimony, there was no evidence that he made an unauthorized entry into the burglarized residences, and the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is insufficient to do so. We disagree.

In Tucker v. State, 205 Ga. App. 683 ( 423 S.E.2d 422) (1992), we held that although the defendant could not be convicted for burglary "on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, . . . slight evidence of a defendant's identity and participation from an extraneous source is all that is required to corroborate the accomplice's testimony, and thus, support the verdict." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 684. Thus, even were the verdict in this case based on slight evidence of corroboration connecting Stephenson with the burglaries, it is legally sufficient. Bradford v. State, 262 Ga. 512 ( 421 S.E.2d 523) (1992). "The necessary corroboration may be by circumstantial evidence. . . . [P]resence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are [also] circumstances from which [Stephenson's] participation in the [crime could] be inferred." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Earl v. State, 214 Ga. App. 891, 892 (1) ( 449 S.E.2d 361) (1994).

In this case, Humphries testified that Stephenson needed money for a new car and that they therefore drove around the area where the burglaries occurred, accompanied by Hyatt and Rider, looking for a good place to rob. The residences they surveyed included the two which were ultimately burglarized. All of this testimony was corroborated by Hyatt and Rider. Hyatt and Rider also testified that after surveying the area, Stephenson drove them to the home of Humphries's mother to spend the night, and early the next morning Humphries tried unsuccessfully to get the pair out of bed to join her and Stephenson in burglarizing the homes. Humphries testified that she and Stephenson then entered two homes, taking guns and jewelry from them. Humphries, Hyatt, and Rider all testified that Humphries and Stephenson then went to Humphries's mother's home where Stephenson assisted Hyatt and Rider in removing diamonds from some of the stolen jewelry. Rider testified that Stephenson told him the jewelry came from the home Stephenson and Humphries had just robbed. Finally, Stephenson admitted that he was present when the diamonds were removed from their settings, that he accompanied the other three to a pawn shop to sell the stolen items, and that when Humphries emerged from the last pawn shop, she handed him $2800 which he used to purchase a car that day. Thus, there was sufficient corroboration evidence that Stephenson participated in the burglaries.

Finally, an accomplice's testimony may be corroborated by the testimony of another accomplice. Cain v. State, 212 Ga. App. 531 ( 442 S.E.2d 279) (8) (1994). Because Humphries was corroborated by Hyatt and Rider in all material parts of her testimony, the jury could believe her testimony that Stephenson entered the homes, despite there being no independent corroboration on this issue. Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434 ( 197 S.E.2d 495) (1973). See also Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416 (1) ( 260 S.E.2d 374) (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ga. App. 786) ( 287 S.E.2d 120) (1982). Thus, we find that there was sufficient evidence to authorize the jury's finding that Stephenson was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).

Judgment affirmed. Beasley, C.J., and Pope, P.J., concur.