PER CURIAM.
Eugene Zimmerman, the assessor for St. Charles County, seeks a declaration that the third sentence in 138.060.1 RSMo Supp. 1993 is unconstitutional. 1993 Mo. Laws 512-13. The circuit court, by summary judgment, upheld the validity of the statute, giving this Court jurisdiction of the appeal. Mo. Const. Art. V, § 3 . Affirmed.
Assessor Zimmerman defends appeals by property owners before the Respondent State Tax Commission. See § 138.430.1. The Commission enforces the third sentence of § 138.060.1:
At any hearing before the state tax commission or a court of competent jurisdiction of an appeal of assessment from a first class charter county or a city not within a county, the assessor shall not advocate nor present evidence advocating a valuation higher than that value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period.
The assessor claims that § 138.060.1 is unconstitutional because it is a special law "changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before . . . other tribunals." Mo. Const. Art. III, § 40(4) . The assessor further claims that § 138.060.1 is an unconstitutional special law because "a general law can be made applicable." Mo. Const. Art. III, § 40(30) .
The Attorney General (who intervened) responds that § 138.060.1 is not a special law because it does not single out political subdivisions by permanent characteristics. See O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood , 850 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. banc 1993). The assessor concedes that, as to first class charter counties, § 138.060.1 is "open-ended" in that other counties may join the class upon becoming first class counties and adopting a home rule charter. An open-ended law is not a special law. See State ex rel. Blue Springs v. Rice , 853 S.W.2d 918, 920-21 (Mo. banc 1993); School District of Riverview Gardens v. St. Louis County , 816 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Mo. banc 1991). As to first class charter counties, § 138.060.1 is not a special law.
Section 138.060.1 also applies to "a city not within an county," that is, St. Louis City. "St. Louis [City] is given specific recognition in Art. VI, § 31, of the Constitution of Missouri as being sui generis, a unique entity in a unique class. Legislation enacted to address the class of which St. Louis [City] is the only member is therefore not special legislation within the meaning of Art. III, § 40." Boyd-Richardson Co. v. Leachman , 615 S.W.2d 46, 52-53 (Mo. banc 1981). Adding St. Louis City to an otherwise open-ended law does not render § 138.060.1 a special law.
Section 138.060.1 is therefore a general law "and needs only a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose." O'Reilly , 850 S.W.2d at 99; Riverview Gardens , 816 S.W.2d at 222; Blaske v. Smith Entzeroth, Inc ., 821 S.W.2d 822, 832 (Mo. banc 1991). The Attorney General offers such a purpose by noting that charter counties and St. Louis City may appoint the assessor, while other counties must elect the assessor. Compare Mo. Const. Art. VI, § 18(b) with § 53.010. The General Assembly could rationally relate the method of choosing the assessor to the valuation advocated or the evidence presented in tax appeals, and draft § 138.060.1 accordingly.
Section 138.060.1 is not a special law within the prohibitions of Article III, section 40(4) and (30) of the Missouri Constitution. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
All concur.