Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law without costs and motion granted. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of defendant National Presto Industries, Inc. (Presto), for summary judgment dismissing the failure to warn causes of action in the complaint. There is no duty "to warn a customer already aware — through common knowledge or learning — of a specific hazard" ( Lancaster Silo Block Co. v Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 65; see also, Lonigro v TDC Elecs., 215 A.D.2d 534; Baptiste v Northfield Foundry Mach. Co., 184 A.D.2d 841, 843; Billsborrow v Dow Chem., 177 A.D.2d 7, 15, n; Lombard v Centrico, Inc., 161 A.D.2d 1071, 1072; Cramer v Toledo Scale Co., 158 A.D.2d 966, 967; Belling v Haugh's Pools, 126 A.D.2d 958, 959, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 602, rearg dismissed 70 N.Y.2d 748). Further, no duty to warn arises where the product-related danger is obvious, readily-discernible or apparent ( see, Lonigro v TDC Elecs., supra; Allessandrini v Weyerhauser Co., 207 A.D.2d 996; Baptiste v Northfield Foundry Mach. Co., supra, at 843; Petrie v Goodrich Co., 175 A.D.2d 669). "Although the adequacy of a warning generally is a question of fact, `in a proper case the court can decide as a matter of law that there is no duty to warn or that the duty has been discharged as a matter of law'" ( Allessandrini v Weyerhauser Co., supra, at 996, quoting Lancaster Silo Block Co. v Northern Propane Gas Co., supra, at 65; see also, Belling v Haugh's Pools, supra, at 959; cf., Feiner v Calvin Klein, Ltd., 157 A.D.2d 501, 502).
From the deposition testimony of plaintiff, it is apparent that she was aware, through her own knowledge and experience, of the specific hazard that caused her daughter's injuries. Moreover, the danger in allowing the cord of a hot deep fryer to dangle over the edge of a kitchen counter is readily apparent. Consequently, Presto had no duty to warn plaintiff of that danger.