Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find no merit to the defendant's contention that the prosecutor's explanations for his peremptory challenges were pretextual. Once the defense made a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination, the burden shifted to the People to provide facially race-neutral explanations for its challenges ( see, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97; Hernandez v New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359). At this step, "`the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral'" ( Purkett v. Elem, 514 US ___, ___, 115 S Ct 1769, 1771, quoting Hernandez v. New York, supra, at 360). After the People offered their facially-neutral explanations, the burden returned to the defense, requiring it to either accept the explanations or establish that they were pretextual ( see, People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 104). The defense counsel did not challenge the explanations offered, and thus, the challenge is waived (see, People v. Allen, supra).
The defendant's contention that he should not receive the maximum sentence on the ground that he may have received a lesser sentence had he pleaded guilty is without merit. "Given that the quid pro quo of the bargaining process will almost necessarily involve offers to moderate sentences that ordinarily would be greater * * * it is also to be anticipated that sentences handed out after trial may be more severe than those proposed in connection with a plea" ( People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, 412, cert denied 449 U.S. 1087). In any event, the sentence imposed was not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Rosenblatt, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter and Goldstein, JJ., concur.