The District Attorney's instructions to the Grand Jury, which tracked the relevant statutory language of Penal Law §§ 220.16 (third degree criminal possession of a controlled substance) and 220.09 (fourth degree criminal possession of a controlled substance), were sufficient to enable that body to determine whether there was legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of both of these crimes (CPL 190.30; People v. Dillon, 207 A.D.2d 793, affd 87 N.Y.2d 885). A Grand Jury need not be charged with the same degree of precision as a petit jury ( People v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36, 38; People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389, 394). Specifically, the prosecutor's omission here to apprise the Grand Jury that the evidence must show that the defendant knew that he possessed the requisite weights of the controlled substance ( see, People v Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 22; People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497) did not impair the integrity of the Grand Jury, as is required for dismissal (CPL 210.35; People v. Darby, 75 N.Y.2d 449, 455). Although the order on appeal referred to a single count in the indictment, the court's reasoning necessarily required dismissal of two counts containing an aggregate weight element, both of which are reinstated pursuant to this order.
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Ellerin, Rubin and Nardelli, JJ.