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Docket Number

S96A0214

Attorney(S)

Alterman Associates, Cathy M. Alterman, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Leonora Grant, Henry M. Newkirk, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Beth Attaway, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Judges

FLETCHER, Presiding Justice.

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Blackburn v. The State (S96A0214) — Supreme Court of Georgia, Decided April 8, 1996

Factual and Procedural Background

Christie Blackburn was tried and convicted for the shooting death of Michael Wilson. The pertinent facts as recited by the court are:

On the night of August 19, 1992, Blackburn was drinking with two co-defendants, Anterian Isaac and Antonio Render, at Blackburn's apartment. Blackburn obtained a gun and the three left the apartment looking for someone to rob.
While walking near the apartment complex they encountered the victim, Michael Wilson. After demanding money, Render shot Wilson in the shoulder, chased him, and then shot him in the right temple, resulting in Wilson's death.
A similar incident involving Antonio Render and a victim named Edward Farley occurred on October 15, 1992, when Render allegedly took Farley's money and shot him in the face at Blackburn's apartment complex; this later incident was the subject of testimony at Blackburn's trial.

Relevant procedural milestones noted in the opinion:

Crime occurred August 19, 1992.
Blackburn was indicted January 7, 1994.
Guilty verdicts were returned March 25, 1994.
Following a sentencing hearing on April 18, 1994, the trial court merged the assault charge into the felony murder charge and sentenced Blackburn to life in prison for felony murder and five years concurrent for the possession charge; an amended sentence was filed May 24, 1994.
Blackburn filed a motion for new trial (after receiving new counsel), which was denied August 25, 1995.
Notice of appeal filed September 15, 1995 and amended October 11, 1995; appeal docketed November 1, 1995 and submitted for decision on briefs December 25, 1995.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence was sufficient, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, to sustain Blackburn's convictions (standard of review).
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Blackburn's motion to sever her trial from her co-defendants (severance/prejudice/confusion), particularly because testimony about a similar subsequent incident involving co-defendant Render was admitted.
Whether the trial court erred in allowing a witness (Edward Farley) to testify first, creating a substantial possibility that the jury would base guilt solely on that evidence.
Whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach its own witness (Diane Freeman) with a prior inconsistent statement, allegedly immaterial and improperly placing Blackburn's character in issue.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Blackburn argued the trial court should have severed her trial from her co-defendants because evidence relating to the co-defendants (including testimony about a later incident involving Render) would confuse the jury and unfairly prejudice her.
Blackburn contended it was error to allow Edward Farley (the victim of the later incident) to testify first, asserting the jury might settle on Blackburn's guilt based solely on that testimony.
Blackburn argued the State should not have been permitted to impeach its own witness, Diane Freeman, on a collateral point and in a way that placed Blackburn's character in issue; Blackburn maintained the impeachment was immaterial and prejudicial.

The opinion does not present a detailed, separate exposition of the appellee's (State's) specific appellate arguments beyond the record of what was done at trial and the State's procedural actions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)	Standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence: whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.	The court applied this standard in concluding that a rational trier of fact could have found Blackburn guilty of the charged offenses.
Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128 (1975)	Referenced in the context of severance and related discretion principles (see citation in discussion of severance).	The court cited this authority in the severance discussion; it concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever given the limiting instruction and the fact the similar-incident evidence concerned Render only.
Render v. State, 266 Ga. 490 (decided March 4, 1996)	Noted as a separately decided case affirming Render's conviction for felony murder (contextual information about a co-defendant).	The opinion notes that this court recently affirmed Render's conviction; the court relied on the record showing the later incident referred to Render only to support denial of severance.
Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798 (1991)	Comparison point concerning admission of multiple similar transactions before evidence on the indicted offenses (illustrative of a more extreme example of potentially prejudicial evidence).	The court used Gilstrap by way of comparison, distinguishing that case (which involved nine similar transactions admitted before the indicted-offense evidence) from the present situation involving a single later incident admitted first for scheduling reasons.
Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470 (1975)	Rule that a party may impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement.	The court relied on this principle in upholding the trial court's decision to allow the State to introduce the witness's prior inconsistent statement to impeach her direct testimony.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the principal issues in four numbered points and applied law to the record as follows:

Sufficiency of the evidence: Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard, the court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury and concluded a rational trier of fact could find Blackburn guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Severance and similar-incident testimony: The court considered Blackburn's contention that testimony about a later incident involving co-defendant Render (the Farley shooting) created confusion and prejudice requiring severance. The court found no danger of confusion because the Farley evidence referred only to Render and clearly showed Blackburn was not involved in that later incident. Further, the trial judge instructed the jury to apply that evidence only to Render. Under those circumstances, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever.
Order of testimony (Farley testifying first): Blackburn argued that allowing Farley to testify first might lead the jury to decide Blackburn's guilt based solely on that testimony. The court noted that the evidence concerned a single incident, was presented first to accommodate the witness's schedule, and the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence applied to Render only. The court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in allowing Farley to testify first and distinguished more extreme situations (as in Gilstrap) where multiple similar transactions had been admitted earlier.
Impeachment of state's witness (Diane Freeman): On cross-examination, Freeman denied having told police about statements Blackburn made regarding the murder. The prosecutor offered Freeman's prior statement to rebut the denial. The court reviewed the record and found that the challenged testimony related directly to the murder for which Blackburn was on trial, so it did not place Blackburn's character in issue improperly. Because Freeman's trial testimony directly contradicted her prior statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prior inconsistent statement to be used for impeachment, consistent with the principle that a party may impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement (Wilson v. State).

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Direct effect on the parties:

Blackburn's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault (which was merged into the felony murder charge), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were affirmed.
Sentence affirmed as to the record: life imprisonment for felony murder and five years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently for the possession charge (the assault conviction was merged).

Broader implications:

The opinion affirms the trial court's discretion in denying severance when similar-incident evidence pertains only to a co-defendant and a limiting instruction is given, upholds the trial court's scheduling-based decision to call a witness early where the evidence concerns a single incident and a limiting instruction is given, and affirms the State's ability to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement when the testimony is directly contradictory and relevant to the charged offense(s). The court did not announce any new legal precedent; it applied existing principles to the facts and concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

All Justices concurred. Opinion authored by Presiding Justice Fletcher.

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BLACKBURN v. THE STATE

FLETCHER, Presiding Justice.

Christie Blackburn was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in the shooting death of Michael Wilson. She appeals, contending that the trial court should have severed her trial from that of her two co-defendants. Because the evidence relating to the two co-defendants did not confuse the jury or prejudice Blackburn, we affirm.

The crime occurred on August 19, 1992. Blackburn was indicted on January 7, 1994. The guilty verdicts were returned on March 25, 1994, and following a sentencing hearing on April 18, the court merged the assault charge into the felony murder charge and sentenced Blackburn to life in prison for felony murder and five years imprisonment, to be served concurrently, for the possession charge. An amended sentence was filed May 24, 1994. After receiving new appointed counsel, Blackburn filed a motion for new trial, which was denied on August 25, 1995. The notice of appeal was filed on September 15, 1995 and amended on October 11, 1995. The appeal was docketed on November 1, 1995 and submitted for decision on briefs on December 25.

The evidence showed that Blackburn was drinking with her two co-defendants, Anterian Isaac and Antonio Render, at Blackburn's apartment on the night Wilson was killed. Blackburn obtained a gun and the threesome left the apartment looking for someone to rob. While walking a path near the apartment complex, they encountered the victim. After demanding money from Wilson, Render shot him in the shoulder. After a chase, the victim stumbled, and Render shot him in the right temple.

This court recently affirmed Render's conviction for felony murder.Render v. State, 266 Ga. 490 (decided March 4, 1996).

1. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination of guilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Blackburn guilty of the crimes charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).

2. The victim of a similar occurrence, Edward Farley, testified that on the night of October 15, 1992, two months after the shooting in this case, Render approached Farley in Blackburn's apartment complex, took his money, and shot him in the face. Blackburn contends this evidence created confusion about which crime was on trial and would be improperly considered against her and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in trying Blackburn with Render and Isaac.

See Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128, 129 (1975).

There was no danger that the jury would be confused by this evidence, because the evidence, which referred to Render only, clearly showed that Blackburn was not involved in the later incident. Additionally, the trial judge instructed the jury to apply the evidence to Render only. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever.

3. Blackburn also contends that the trial court erred in allowing Farley to testify first in the trial, because there was a substantial possibility that the jury settled on Blackburn's guilt based solely on that evidence. The evidence, however, involved only one incident, was offered first to accommodate the witness' schedule, and the trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence against Render only. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Farley to testify first.

Compare Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 799 ( 410 S.E.2d 423) (1991) (admission of nine similar transactions before evidence on indicted offenses).

4. Diane Freeman, Blackburn's roommate, testified for the state. On direct examination, Freeman denied telling the police about certain statements Blackburn made to her about the murder. To rebut this testimony, the prosecutor offered Freeman's prior statement to police. Blackburn contends that the state should not have been allowed to impeach its own witness on a point immaterial to the case and in a manner that placed Blackburn's character in issue. A review of the record shows that the challenged testimony all related to the murder for which Blackburn was on trial. Therefore, the statement did not improperly place Blackburn's character in issue. Because Freeman's testimony was in direct contradiction to her prior statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prior statement in evidence. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 474 (1975) (party may impeach own witness with prior inconsistent statement).