Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, a municipal parking lot falls within the scope of Village Law § 6-628 which, inter alia, requires prior written notice of a defective condition as a condition precedent to maintaining an action against a village arising from a sidewalk or highway defect ( see, Lauria v. City of New Rochelle, 225 A.D.2d 1013; Mendes v. Whitney-Floral Realty Corp., 216 A.D.2d 540; Stratton v. City of Beacon, 91 A.D.2d 1018; Ebert v. Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 21 Misc.2d 607). The record supports the Supreme Court's finding that the defendant did not receive the requisite written notice of the alleged defective condition and there was no evidence that the defendant affirmatively created the condition. Thus, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly granted ( see, Bess v. Village of E. Hampton, 225 A.D.2d 511; Zwielich v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 208 A.D.2d 920; Mollahan v. Village of Port Washington N., 153 A.D.2d 881).
The plaintiff's assertion that the hole in which he fell was created by whoever paved the parking lot was without any evidentiary foundation and purely speculative and, therefore, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant created the condition ( see, Mendes v. Whitney-Floral Realty Corp., supra). Balletta, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter, Pizzuto and Altman, JJ., concur.