Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
It is well settled that where an alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from a subcontractor's own methods in performing the work, and the general contractor exercises no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attaches to the general contractor either under the common law or under Labor Law § 200 ( see, Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 877; Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290, 295). In the case at bar, there was no evidence that the defendant third-party plaintiff Cofire Paving Corp. (hereinafter Cofire) exercised any supervisory control or had any input into how the work at the project site was to be performed. Accordingly, the cause of action asserted under Labor Law § 200 was properly dismissed ( see, Lombardi v. Stout, supra, at 295; Rojas v. County of Nassau, 210 A.D.2d 390; D'Avila v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 729).
Additionally, the allegations of the complaint and the plaintiff's bill of particulars made a generalized claim of common-law negligence and referred solely to Cofire's alleged failure to comply with general safety standards. The plaintiff did not allege that Cofire failed to comply with any concrete specifications mandated under the Industrial Code ( see, 12 NYCRR part 23). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the claims asserted under Labor Law § 241 (6) ( see, Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., supra, at 878; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 503-505; Rojas v County of Nassau, supra; D'Avila v. City of New York, supra). Balletta, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.