Once a criminal action is commenced against a defendant, the People must be prepared to proceed to trial within six months, plus excludable time, from the date of defendant's arraignment (CPL 30.30 [a]; [4]; People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236, 239; People v. Sigismundi, 222 A.D.2d 382, 383). Since defendant herein was arraigned on May 10, 1992, the six-month period amounts to 184 days. The trial court found that because 223 days were chargeable to the People, the indictment must be dismissed. We disagree.
On June 30, 1992, the case was adjourned "for Defense motions" to August 4, 1992, a period of 35 days. Although the hearing court found this period to be includable, it was, in fact, excludable as time expended for motion practice ( see, People v Buong Sai, 223 A.D.2d 439-440; People v. Bissereth, 194 A.D.2d 317, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 714).
Further, the 133-day period from August 4, 1992 to December 15, 1992 is excludable, as expressly conceded by defendant ( see, People v. Boyd, 189 A.D.2d 433, 438, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 714; see also, People v. Yanez, 218 A.D.2d 719, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 875). As a result, a total of 168 days were improperly charged to the People and, accordingly, the indictment should not have been dismissed.
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Kupferman, Ross and Tom, JJ.