Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
"The Sixth Amendment requires that jury panels be drawn from a source representing a `fair cross section' of the community in which the defendant is tried * * * In other words, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the opportunity for a representative jury venire, not a representative venire itself" ( United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1244). In determining whether there has been a violation of the "fair cross section" requirement, the court must consider (1) whether the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group within the community, (2) that the representation from this group is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, and (3) "that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process" ( Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364). While the defendant, an African-American, demonstrated that he was a member of a "distinctive group", he failed to substantiate his claim that the African-American community was underrepresented in jury pools in Suffolk County, as a result of a "systematic exclusion" of these individuals in the jury-selection process ( see, People v Guzman, 60 N.Y.2d 403, 411; People v. Battle, 221 A.D.2d 648; People v. Woolfolk, 192 A.D.2d 883; People v. Bessard, 148 A.D.2d 49). Accordingly, we reject the defendant's contention that the process for generating the jury pool was unconstitutional.
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Pizzuto and Goldstein, JJ., concur.