Ordered that the appeal from the order dated December 1, 1994, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the order dated June 23, 1995, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated June 23, 1995, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which adhered to so much of the prior determination as directed the appellant to respond to items four, five, and six of the plaintiffs' demand for a bill of particulars regarding her ninth affirmative defense and substituting therefor a provision striking those items; as so modified, the order is affirmed, insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements and the order dated December 1, 1994, is modified accordingly.
The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant's request for an order directing the plaintiffs to provide additional responses to certain items in her demand for a bill of particulars and in her combined demands for discovery as the plaintiffs' responses were sufficiently particular at this pre-discovery stage of the proceedings ( see, Bharwani v. del Rosario, 180 A.D.2d 704; Coleman v. Richards, 138 A.D.2d 556; CPLR 3043 [a]). Under the circumstances of this case, where the infant-plaintiff was allegedly repeatedly assaulted while in the appellant's care, the plaintiffs' response that the incidents took place on a continual basis from May 1992 through and including August 7, 1992, sufficiently apprised the appellant of the allegations against her to enable her to prepare a defense to this action ( see, e.g., People v. Watt, 84 N.Y.2d 948). Item 33 in the appellant's demand for a bill of particulars was improper ( see, Kwang Sik Kim v. A K Plastic Prods., 133 A.D.2d 219).
The appellant moved for a protective order with respect to the plaintiffs' demand for a bill of particulars concerning her affirmative defenses, and the plaintiffs cross moved for an order directing the appellant to respond. We conclude that items four, five, and six of the plaintiffs' demand for a bill of particulars, which relate to the appellant's ninth affirmative defense, should have been stricken, as those items sought either evidentiary material ( see, Coleman v. Richards, supra) or the grounds of the appellant's legal arguments ( see, Ginsberg v Ginsberg, 104 A.D.2d 482, 484).
We have considered the appellant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. O'Brien, J.P., Santucci, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.