The IAS Court properly construed the definition of "total price" contained in Administrative Code of the City of New York § 26-702 (b) (1) — "the number of all shares in the offering multiplied by the last price per share which was offered to tenants in occupancy prior to the effective date of the plan regardless of number of sales made" — as the price in effect just prior to the effective date, and not, as defendants contend, as the price in effect during the exclusive purchase period, i.e., the so-called "insider's price". While defendants refer to the legislative history of the statute to buttress their claim that the "insider price" should have been used, the statutory language, "last price per share which was offered to tenants in occupancy prior to the effective date of the plan", is clear and unambiguous.
"A statute must be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words ( Riegert Apts. Corp. v. Planning Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 206) and resort to extrinsic matter, such as the legislative history, is inappropriate when the statutory language is unambiguous and the meaning unequivocal ( Giblin v. Nassau County Med. Center, 61 N.Y.2d 67; Sega v. State of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 183; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1)." ( Matter of Daniel C., 99 A.D.2d 35, 41, affd 63 N.Y.2d 927.)
We have examined the remaining contentions of defendants and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Ellerin, Wallach, Nardelli and Mazzarelli, JJ.