HADDEN v. CIRELLI

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Docket Number

No. 95-2235.

Attorney(S)

Dennis Wells, Lake Mary, for Appellant. Stephen P. Sapienza, Bunnell, for Appellees.

Judges

ANTOON, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

John T. Hadden III appeals a final summary judgment that determined he has no interest in two parcels of property (Parcels A and B) and quieted title in favor of appellee Emilio Cirelli. The properties were originally purchased by John Hadden's parents, Kathleen and John Thomas Hadden, held as tenants by the entireties during their marriage. After their divorce in 1967 and remarriage, their second marriage was dissolved in 1978 by a final judgment which directed the father to convey certain properties, including Parcel A, to the mother, but was silent on Parcel B.

The father never executed a deed to transfer his interest in either parcel to the mother. Subsequently, federal tax liens were imposed on the mother, resulting in the seizure and public auction sale of her interests in the properties to Emilio Cirelli. Mr. Cirelli sued to quiet title in both parcels, seeking to extinguish the father's interests. John Hadden intervened, claiming ownership interests in the parcels through purported unrecorded deeds from his father and an affidavit from his mother asserting a retained one-half interest by each parent. The trial court entered summary judgment for Mr. Cirelli, finding that the 1978 dissolution judgment automatically transferred the father's interests to the mother, leaving the father with only record title without any ownership interest to convey. John Hadden appeals this ruling.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the 1978 dissolution judgment operated as a matter of law to transfer the father's interests in Parcels A and B to the mother.
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment quieting title in favor of Emilio Cirelli based on the alleged automatic transfer of title by the dissolution judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

John Hadden asserted that he has an ownership interest in Parcels A and B because he purchased his father's interests via two unrecorded deeds.
He submitted his mother's affidavit stating that despite the 1978 dissolution judgment, both parents had agreed to retain equal ownership interests in the marital real estate after the dissolution.
He argued that the 1978 dissolution judgment did not automatically transfer the father's interests in the properties to the mother, particularly since the father never executed the deed as directed.

Appellee's Arguments

Emilio Cirelli contended that the 1978 dissolution judgment conveyed the father's interest in Parcel A to the mother by operation of law, citing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.570(d).
He argued that even if statutory and procedural rules did not apply, case law supports the trial court's conclusion that the father's interest was extinguished by the dissolution judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1994)	Statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent.	The court held that the 1994 statute on equitable distribution could not be applied retroactively to the 1978 dissolution judgment.
Sharp v. Hamilton, 520 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1988)	A dissolution judgment awarding full title as lump sum alimony operates as defeasance of the other spouse's interest.	Distinguished as factually different because the judgment in the instant case was not self-executing and did not automatically transfer title.
Liberman v. Kelso, 354 So.2d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)	Transfer of interest pursuant to dissolution judgment is equivalent to defeasance of the other spouse's interest.	Distinguished for the same reasons as Sharp; the instant judgment did not effect an automatic transfer.
Holt v. Boozel, 394 So.2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)	Dissolution judgment recognizing a special equity can divest a spouse of an interest in real property.	Distinguished as the instant judgment did not recognize a special equity or transfer interest automatically.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether the 1978 dissolution judgment operated to transfer the father's interests in Parcels A and B to the mother. For Parcel B, the judgment was silent and there was no evidence of transfer, so the court found the trial court erred in concluding the father's interest was extinguished. The existence of an unrecorded deed created a factual dispute precluding summary judgment.

Regarding Parcel A, the court examined two legal mechanisms that could effect a transfer by judgment: Florida Statute section 61.075(4) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.570(d). The statute did not apply retroactively and was enacted long after the 1978 judgment, and the judgment did not qualify as a "judgment distributing assets." Rule 1.570(d) applies only when a judgment is "for a conveyance, transfer, release, or acquittance" of property. The 1978 judgment merely directed the father to convey title within 20 days but did not itself transfer title. Because the father never executed a deed, the judgment was not self-executing and did not operate to transfer title automatically.

The court further distinguished prior case law where dissolution judgments either expressly transferred title or recognized a special equity, which was not the case here. The court noted that enforcement mechanisms under rule 1.570(c) could compel transfer but do not effect automatic transfer by judgment.

Because factual disputes exist regarding the ownership interests, particularly given the unrecorded deeds and affidavits, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the trial court's summary judgment quieting title in favor of Emilio Cirelli.

The decision means the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the 1978 dissolution judgment automatically transferred the father's interests in Parcels A and B to the mother. The case must be remanded for further proceedings to resolve factual disputes concerning John Hadden's ownership interests. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court reaffirmed the principle that a dissolution judgment must be self-executing or specifically transfer interests to operate as a conveyance of property.

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JOHN T. HADDEN III, APPELLANT, v. EMILIO CIRELLI, ET AL., APPELLEES.

ANTOON, Judge.

John T. Hadden III (John Hadden) appeals the final summary judgment determining that he has no interest in two parcels of property, and quieting title in favor of appellee, Emilio Cirelli. We reverse.

During their marriage, John Hadden's mother, Kathleen (mother), and father, John Thomas (father), purchased two parcels of property (Parcels A and B), which they held as tenants by the entireties. The mother and father divorced in 1967, but later remarried. Their second marriage was dissolved in 1978 by a final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered in Volusia County. The judgment directed the father to convey certain parcels of property to the mother, including Parcel A, but was silent as to the disposition of Parcel B. The judgment provided in part:

Parcel A is described as Tract No. 16 located in Volusia County. Parcel B is described as Lots 4, 6, 7, and 8 in the Jefferies Subdivision in Lake Helen.

4. This Court renders full faith and credit to that certain Final Judgment entered November 2, 1967 . . . . which Final Judgment dissolved the previous marriage of the parties to the instant cause and incorporated by reference the Property Settlement Agreement of the parties . . . . wherein and whereby the Respondent-Husband, JOHN THOMAS HADDEN, JR. agreed to convey his interest in certain properties owned jointly by the parties hereto to the Petitioner-wife, KATHLEEN HADDEN.

5. In consideration of the aforesaid Final Judgment, the Respondent-Husband is ordered and directed by this court to convey all right, title, and interest in the following described real properties to the Petitioner-wife within 20 days of the entry of this Final Judgment . . . (Emphasis added).

The father never executed a deed conveying his interest in either Parcel A or Parcel B to the mother.

Thereafter, federal tax liens were imposed against the mother. Her interest in the properties was seized, and later sold to Emilio Cirelli at public auction. In 1994, Mr. Cirelli sued to quiet title in Parcels A and B. His complaint sought, among other things, to extinguish the father's interests in the two properties. The complaint asserted that Mr. Cirelli obtained sole title to the properties when he acquired the mother's interests at the public auction.

The trial court permitted John Hadden to intervene and answer the complaint to quiet title. In response to Mr. Cirelli's motion for summary judgment, John Hadden submitted his affidavit stating that he had an ownership interest in Parcels A and B because he had purchased his father's interests in the two properties. To support this assertion, he filed copies of two unrecorded deeds purporting to show that the father had transferred his interests in both parcels to him. He also filed his mother's affidavit stating that, notwithstanding the terms of the 1978 dissolution judgment, she and the father had agreed that each would retain a one-half interest in the marital real estate after their marriage was dissolved.

The trial court entered summary judgment quieting title in favor of Mr. Cirelli. In so ruling, the court found that John Hadden had no interest in either Parcel A or Parcel B because the 1978 dissolution judgment automatically transferred the father's interest in the property to the mother. The trial court found that after the dissolution judgment was entered the father's only interest in the properties was that of "record title" holder, and thus, the father had no interest which could be subsequently conveyed.

John Hadden appeals the trial court's ruling, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the 1978 dissolution judgment operated to transfer the father's interests in Parcels A and B to the mother. We agree.

We first address Parcel B. The 1978 dissolution judgment makes no mention of Parcel B, and there is no record evidence that the father ever transferred his interest in this parcel to the mother. The record only shows that the father and mother held this property as tenants by the entireties during their marriage. Under these circumstances, the trial court's ruling that the 1978 dissolution judgment extinguished the father's interest in Parcel B must be reversed. We note that John Hadden's submission of the unrecorded deed to Parcel B creates, at the very least, an issue of fact concerning whether John Hadden has an ownership interest in the property.

As for Parcel A, there are two circumstances in Florida wherein the entry of a dissolution judgment operates to transfer title to real property. One is outlined in section 61.075 (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and the other is set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.570. Section 61.075 (4), provides in pertinent part:

61.075 Equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities. —

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(4) The judgment distributing assets shall have the effect of a duly executed instrument of conveyance, transfer, release, or acquisition which is recorded in the county where the property is located when the judgment, or a certified copy of the judgment, is recorded in the official records of the county in which the property is located.

However, this provision was not enacted until October 1, 1994 — sixteen years after the instant dissolution judgment was entered. Both parties properly agree that the terms of the statute cannot be applied retroactively and, as a result, the statute is not relevant to the resolution of this appeal. See Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1994) (retroactive application of a statute is not available absent a clear expression of legislative intent). In any event, the statute refers to a "judgment distributing assets," and the 1978 dissolution judgment did not distribute assets. Thus, even if retroactively applied to the facts in this case, the statute would be irrelevant.

Rule 1.570 (d) also addresses the issue of when entry of a judgment operates to convey an interest in real property:

Rule 1.570 ENFORCEMENT OF FINAL JUDGMENTS

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(d) Vesting Title. If the judgment is for a conveyance, transfer, release, or acquittance of real or personal property, the judgment shall have the effect of a duly executed conveyance, transfer, release or acquittance that is recorded in the county where the judgment is recorded.

Mr. Cirelli maintains that application of this rule supports the trial court's conclusion that the 1978 dissolution judgment conveyed the father's interest in Parcel A to the mother. This argument is without merit because the specific language of the dissolution judgment is not "for a conveyance [or] transfer" of the property. Instead, the judgment merely directed the father to convey all right, title, and interest in Parcel A to the mother within 20 days of the entry of the judgment. As noted above, no such transfer ever occurred.

Mr. Cirelli further maintains that, even if we conclude that section 61.075 (4) and rule 1.570 do not apply to the facts in this case, the trial court's ruling concerning Parcel A can be affirmed because our courts have recognized certain additional circumstances where the entry of a dissolution judgment conveys title to real property. While we acknowledge the existence of such case law, it is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case.

A final dissolution judgment can transfer a party's interest in real property when the language of the judgment specifically operates to transfer an interest or recognizes an existing interest. For example, in Sharp v. Hamilton, 520 So.2d 9, 10-11 (Fla. 1988), the supreme court held that a "judgment of dissolution ordering [the wife] be awarded full title to the entireties' property as lump sum alimony operates as a defeasance of the husband's interest in the property . . ." In Liberman v. Kelso, 354 So.2d 137, 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), the second district reached the same conclusion, stating that ". . . the transfer of the husband's interest to the wife pursuant to the judgment of dissolution was equivalent to the defeasance of the husband's interest in the property. . . ." Similarly, in Holt v. Boozel, 394 So.2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), this court concluded that the final dissolution judgment was sufficient to divest the husband of an interest in real property by recognizing the wife's special equity in real property and declaring it to be her sole and exclusive property.

These cases are factually distinguishable because the language in the dissolution judgments was self-executing; that is, the language either actually transferred a property interest from one spouse to the other, or declared that one spouse held a superior interest in the property prior to the dissolution of marriage. In contrast, the Hadden's 1978 dissolution judgment was not self-executing. It did not operate to automatically transfer the father's interest, nor did it recognize a special equity of the mother. The judgment merely incorporated the terms of the parties' settlement agreement and then directed the father to transfer his interest in Parcel A to the mother within 20 days. When the father failed to comply, the judgment did not automatically operate to transfer his interest in Parcel A to the mother.

The mother certainly could have enforced the father's obligation to transfer his interest in the property by utilizing subsection (c) of rule 1.570 which provides that one who fails to transfer an interest in real property who is required to do so in a judgment, is subject to contempt. Subsection (c) also provides for the appointment of a person to convey title.

In conclusion, although the trial court may have reasonably questioned whether the execution of the two deeds by the father after the commencement of Mr. Cirelli's quiet title action was made in good faith, the instant record contains issues of material fact concerning John Hadden's ownership interests in Parcels A and B. Accordingly, we must reverse the summary judgement order.

REVERSED.

PETERSON, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.