AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. JOSEPH HLADKY, Appellant.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

In its report, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant's sentence for burglary in the second degree under count eleven of the indictment, and his sentence for robbery in the second degree under count thirteen of the indictment, were to run consecutively to each other and to the consecutive sentences imposed upon the defendant's convictions of intentional murder (two counts). The record demonstrates that the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper. The intentional murders were separate and distinct from the burglary and robbery offenses, although they were part of a continuous course of conduct ( see, Penal Law § 70.25; People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839, 843). Therefore, the sentences imposed for burglary in the second degree under count eleven of the indictment and robbery in the second degree under count thirteen of the indictment could lawfully run consecutively to the consecutive sentences imposed for intentional murder, notwithstanding the fact that counts eleven and thirteen of the indictment served as predicate felonies for the defendant's conviction of four counts of felony murder ( see, People v. Nathan, 224 A.D.2d 640; People v. Mebert, 194 A.D.2d 809; People v. Hunt, 174 A.D.2d 980; People v. Bailey, 167 A.D.2d 951; People Hildreth, 148 A.D.2d 879; People v Ferkins, 116 A.D.2d 760; see also, People v. Adams, 163 A.D.2d 881). Likewise, under the facts of this case, the conduct constituting the burglary under count eleven was separate and distinct from the conduct constituting the robbery under count thirteen. Accordingly, the imposition of consecutive sentences for burglary in the second degree and robbery in the second degree was lawful ( see, Penal Law § 70.25; People v Beverly, 220 A.D.2d 881; People v. Dorsey, 79 A.D.2d 611; People v Bryant, 31 A.D.2d 934).

The trial court properly discharged a sworn juror during the trial and replaced her with an alternate juror ( see, CPL 270.35; People v. Jamison, 203 A.D.2d 385; People v. Morgan, 175 A.D.2d 184; People v. Rivera, 172 A.D.2d 570). Copertino, J.P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

PEOPLE v. HLADKY
(Jul 1, 1996)