Ordered that the order entered July 6, 1995, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, the determination granting the motion of the defendant Slezak for a mistrial and, in effect, setting aside the jury's verdict on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Slezak is vacated, the motion of the defendant Slezak is denied, and the jury's verdict is reinstated; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the order entered November 1, 1995, is dismissed as academic; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiffs are awarded one bill of costs payable by the defendant Slezak.
Under the circumstances presented, we agree with the appellants' contention that the sole, isolated, and unintentionally elicited reference made by the defendant William Coffey to a statement he provided to an insurance company representative for the defendant Slezak, was not so prejudicial as to warrant the granting of a mistrial ( see, Sakin v. Fryman, 147 A.D.2d 626; Manchester v. Bankhead Corp., 125 A.D.2d 740; Rush v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 92 A.D.2d 1072; Knapp v. Fulton County Natl. Bank Trust Co., 6 A.D.2d 742; Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623).
In light of the fact that we are reinstating the jury verdict, which was in favor of the appellants and against the defendant Slezak only, and exonerated the defendant Coffey from any liability, we need not consider the appellants' challenges to the November 1, 1995, order which granted the cross motion of the defendant Coffey dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Miller, J.P., O'Brien, Goldstein and McGinity, JJ., concur.