While defendant never appealed from the "amended", i.e., the final, judgment entered herein, that judgment did no more than ministerially implement the order of September 7, 1995, from which defendant did appeal, and, accordingly, defendant's appeal should be considered on the merits ( First Inter-County Bank v DeFilippis, 160 AD2d 288, lv denied 77 NY2d 801). There is no merit to defendant's claim that issues of fact exist as to the actual, implied or apparent authority of its president to enter into the consulting agreement in issue, which was not so unusual as to make it unreasonable for plaintiff to assume such authority ( see, Ullman-Briggs, Inc. v Salton, Inc., 754 F Supp 1003, 1006-1007). Nor is there merit to plaintiff's claim that it should have been awarded $72,000, the full value of the contract, absent evidence of its attempts to mitigate damages after defendant's breach. Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of defendant's breach (CPLR 5001), and we modify accordingly.