Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Rushing v. State, Case No. 96-1396 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 13, 1996)

Factual and Procedural Background

William Larry Rushing was charged with two counts of forgery and one count of obstructing an officer for signing a friend's name to two traffic tickets. On appeal he argued his conduct constituted the misdemeanor offense of making a false official statement in writing under section 837.06, Florida Statutes (1993), rather than forgery. The appeal is from the Circuit Court for Marion County. The district court affirmed the convictions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether signing another person's name to a traffic citation constitutes the felony of forgery under section 831.01, Florida Statutes.
  2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for obstructing an officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Rushing contended that his conduct was the misdemeanor of making a false official statement in writing under § 837.06, not the felony of forgery, and thus should not support a forgery conviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State v. Escobedo, 404 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1982) Defines elements of forgery: making a writing falsely purporting to be another's, intent to injure or defraud, and that the instrument have legal efficacy. Court relied on these elements to evaluate whether signing another's name to a traffic ticket constitutes forgery.
Nikolic v. State, 439 So.2d 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) Dicta that a traffic ticket can support a forgery conviction because the ticket serves as an appearance bond once signed. Used as persuasive support that a signed traffic ticket operates as an appearance bond and thus may be subject to forgery laws.
Davis v. State, 111 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) Holding that signing a false name to an appearance bond issued by a bonding company constitutes forgery. Found consistent with holding that signing another's name to a traffic citation can constitute forgery.
State v. Cogswell, 521 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 1988) Principle that prosecuting an offense as a felony is permissible even if similar conduct is treated as a misdemeanor under a separate statute. Cited to support that treating the conduct as forgery (felony) was permissible despite a separate misdemeanor statute.
Thornton v. State, 636 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) Example where signing another's name on a fingerprint card was forgery when done to conceal identity and criminal record. Offered as additional authority supporting that signing another's name can constitute forgery when done with intent to defraud.
Charles E. Tocia, 4 Wharton's Criminal Law § 496 (1981) Textual authority: one who signs another's name commits forgery. Used as doctrinal support for the proposition that signing another's name is forgery.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory definition of forgery in § 831.01 and the elements identified in State v. Escobedo: (1) making a writing that falsely purports to be the writing of another, (2) intent to injure or defraud, and (3) the instrument's legal efficacy. The court concluded that a defendant's signature on a traffic ticket functions as an appearance bond under § 318.14, and the ticket establishes notice of the hearing; therefore signing another's name to such a ticket meets the Escobedo elements and constitutes forgery. The court cited Nikolic and Davis as supportive authorities and referenced Thornton and Wharton's as additional support. The court also noted that prosecuting the conduct as a felony forgery is permissible even if a separate statute treats similar conduct as a misdemeanor, citing State v. Cogswell. Independently, the court found the evidence sufficient to sustain the obstructing-an-officer conviction.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED.

Direct effect: The district court affirmed Rushing's convictions for forgery and for obstructing an officer. The opinion treats signing another's name to a traffic citation as falling within the statutory definition of forgery and upholds that prosecution as a felony is permissible despite a separate misdemeanor statute addressing false official statements. The opinion does not announce or purport to establish a novel legal rule beyond its application to these facts.

WILLIAM LARRY RUSHING, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE.

PER CURIAM.

Rushing was charged with two counts of forgery and one count of obstructing an officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty for signing a friend's name to two traffic tickets. He argues on appeal that his crime was merely the misdemeanor offense of making a false official statement in writing under section 837.06, Florida Statutes (1993), not forgery, the crime of which he was convicted. We affirm.

§ 831.01, Fla. Stat. (1993).

§ 843.02, Fla. Stat. (1993).

Section 831.01, Florida Statutes (1995), defines the crime of forgery as follows:

Whoever falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits a public record, or a certificate, return or attestation of any clerk or register of a court, public register, notary public, town clerk or any public officer, in relation to a matter where such certificate, return or attestation may be received as legal proof; or a charter, deed, will, testament, bond, or writing obligatory, letter of attorney, policy of insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange or promissory note, or an order, acquittance, or discharge for money or other property, or an acceptance of a bill of exchange or promissory note for the payment of money, or any receipt for money, goods, or other property, or any passage ticket, pass or other evidence of transportation issued by a common carrier, with intent to injure or defraud any person, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Under this statute, a conviction for forgery requires the making of a writing which falsely purports to be the writing of another. See State v. Escobedo, 404 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1982). The writing must be made with intent to injure or defraud any person. Id. Finally, the instrument must have some legal efficacy. Id.

We conclude that signing another's name to a traffic citation does constitute the offense of forgery. A defendant's signature on a traffic ticket seems to operate as an appearance bond, so signing another's name on a ticket would be forgery. See § 318.14, Fla. Stat. (1993) ("Except as provided in s. 316.1001(2) [pertaining to toll roads], any person cited for an infraction under this section must sign and accept a citation indicating a promise to appear."); Nikolic v. State, 439 So.2d 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (stating in dicta that a traffic ticket would support a conviction for forgery because the ticket serves as an appearance bond once the defendant has signed it). The ticket also operates to establish that a defendant has received notice of the hearing. Holding that signing a false name on a traffic ticket constitutes forgery also appears to be consistent with Davis v. State, 111 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), where the First District held that signing a false name to an appearance bond issued by a bonding company constitutes the offense of forgery. Moreover, prosecuting the offenses as the felony of forgery, even if the same conduct is treated as a misdemeanor by a separate statute, is permissible. See State v. Cogswell, 521 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 1988).

See also Thornton v. State, 636 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant who signed name of another on fingerprint card made at time of arrest committed forgery, where signature was made with intent to defraud by concealing defendant's true identity and criminal record); Charles E. Tocia, 4 Wharton's Criminal Law § 496 (1981) (one who signs another's name commits forgery).

Independent of this analysis, we also find the evidence sufficient to sustain Rushing's conviction for obstructing an officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty.

AFFIRMED.

PETERSON, C.J., GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

RUSHING v. STATE
(Dec 13, 1996)