Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs. Pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-501, a loan shall be deemed usurious if it exceeds an interest rate of 16% per annum ( see, Banking Law § 14-a). It is well settled, however, that where a loan is made to a corporation, the corporation and the individual guarantors of a corporate obligation are prohibited by statute from interposing the defense of usury ( see, General Obligations Law § 5-521; Schneider v Phelps, 41 NY2d 238; Webar, Inc. v Capra, 212 AD2d 594). An exception to the general rule is recognized, however, "`where the corporate form is used to conceal a usurious loan to an individual to discharge his personal obligations, and not to further a corporate enterprise' "( Webar, Inc. v Capra, supra, at 595, quoting Sanders Assocs. v Friedman, 137 AD2d 677).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court correctly found that the loan issued to the corporate defendant at an interest rate of 24% was, with the Plaintiff's knowledge, in actuality a loan to an officer of the corporate defendant being used to discharge his personal obligations, and therefore, usurious ( see, Freitas v Geddes Sav. Loan Assn., 63 NY2d 254; K.P. Assocs. v DAgostino, 201 AD2d 537; Sanders Assocs. v Friedman, supra). Inasmuch as the court's determination was "based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence, and the factual findings based upon the credibility of the witnesses", it will not now be disturbed ( Wolfson v Kasa Lithuanian Fed. Credit Union, 168 AD2d 364; see also, Fried v Bolanos, 217 AD2d 823). Accordingly, the court properly declared the mortgage securing the loan null and void and dismissed the complaint ( see, General Obligations Law § 5-511; Hilal v Lipton, 227 AD2d 378).
The plaintiff's remaining contention is academic.