Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
"[W]aiver is the voluntary abandonment or relinquishment of a known right, which, except for such waiver, the party would have enjoyed" ( P D Cards Gifts v Matejka, 150 AD2d 660, 662). Waiver "may be accomplished by express agreement or by such conduct or failure to act as to evince an intent not to claim the purported advantage" ( Madden v Consolidated Edison Co., 45 NY2d 466, 469) and is generally a question of fact ( see, Jefpaul Garage Corp. v Presbyterian Hosp., 61 NY2d 442, 446). Moreover, the existence of a nonwaiver clause does not in itself preclude waiver of a contract clause ( see, TSS-Seedman's, Inc. v Elota Realty Co., 72 NY2d 1024; P D Cards Gifts v Matejka, supra; Lee v Wright, 108 AD2d 678). Accordingly, we disagree with the appellants' contention that the existence of a general nonwaiver clause in the condominium by-laws in and of itself precludes waiver of the right to enforce a provision of the by-laws or the rules and regulations.
Moreover, questions of fact exist as to whether the appellant Board of Managers of Inwood Hills Condominium failed to enforce the no-pets provision of the rules and regulations, and whether the Board made representations to the Plaintiff's that the no-pets provision was not enforced, thereby waiving its right to enforce a no-pet rule against the Plaintiff's.