PETER McNIFF, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
The Third Interim Application for Professional Compensation filed by McKenna Cuneo, L.L.P., special counsel, came before the court for hearing on April 24, 1997. Objections were filed by Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company and the United States Trustee. The court has considered the application, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is prepared to rule.
This is the third application by McKenna Cuneo for services incurred by the debtor to prosecute his appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The majority of the services itemized in this application were for preparing a reply brief and for preparing and attending the oral argument. McKenna Cuneo requests approval of fees in the amount of $33,260.40 and expenses of $4,474.69 for a total request of $37,735.09. The total represents a voluntary reduction of 10%; in the amount of fees incurred.
The objectors complain as follows: that the use of computerized research services exceeds what is reasonable for the issues involved; that the fees; for services in connection with the preparation of the reply brief and oral argument are excessive; and that the services incurred in connection with preparation and defense of the second interim fee application were mostly unnecessary and, therefore, the fee is excessive.
The court's views on the applicable law and the reasonableness standards for allowance of attorney fees are well known. In fact, the court discussed the fee award parameters in the previous order awarding fees to McKenna Cuneo. A court's task is to determine a reasonable fee based on the number of hours spent on the task and at a reasonable hourly rate. Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1986). When counsel loses the objectivity necessary to exercise billing judgment, the court must provide its own determination.
In this case, the objectors failed to provide total sums of the amounts they deem unreasonable. The application itself includes an itemization of total fees incurred by each individual attorney or paralegal and a separate total for each category of services. One of these categories reflects a voluntary 10% reduction in fees and one does not. The fees incurred for the preparation of the reply brief and the oral argument are totaled together. Each professional bills time at a different rate, but the application utilizes the blended rate previously applied in this court's order on the second interim application. For all these reasons, a precise review of the application for purposes of applying the lodestar analysis is difficult.
Despite these difficulties, the court calculates `that the applicant seeks fees for 29 hours of time Mr. Shapiro spent in connection with the oral argument. The court concludes that the hours incurred and the services performed were beneficial and necessary and that Mr. Shapiro's hourly rate of $190 is reasonable. Total fees will be allowed of $5,510.
The paralegal services are also reasonable, and the use of paralegal services should be encouraged and compensated. Therefore, the court will allow a total paralegal fee for 22.4 hours at the rate of $70 per hour, i.e., $1,568.
The court also finds that the fees incurred in connection with the settlement negotiations are compensable. These fees will be allowed at the combined billing rate of $140, for a total allowance of $1,302.
The applicant seeks $19,558 for preparation of the reply brief at a blended rate of $140. This represents approximately 140 hours of time by various members of the firm, or by the objectors' analysis, four full billing weeks.
The court agrees with the objectors that the amount sought for preparation of the reply brief is excessive. By contrast with this request, the court allowed reimbursement for 240 hours for all attorneys in connection with preparation of the opening brief. This firm of attorneys is highly skilled and experienced. The issues were fully known to them prior to the reply stage. The issues were obviously exhaustively researched when they prepared the opening brief. The court: concludes that 70 hours of time for the reply brief is reasonable. Fees will be allowed for preparation of the reply brief in the amount of $9,800.
Additional discussion is necessary with regard to `the fees requested for preparation and defense of the second interim fee application. In this category, counsel seeks $9,898 at the blended rate of $140.
In the Tenth Circuit, fees are routinely allowed for services performed in preparation of the requisite fee applications. In re Amdura Corp., 139 B.R. 963, 985 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1992); In re CF I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 131 B.R. 474, 483 (Bankr.D.Utah 1991). Attorneys who do not generally practice before the bankruptcy court are compensated for research and for additional hours above the usual fees requested for such tasks. Id. at 484.
Even so, bankruptcy courts place a variety of limitations on fee allowances in this area. In re Amdura, 139 B.R. at 984 (court practice is to authorize at one-half hourly rate); In re Spanjer Bros., Inc., 203 B.R. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (district standard allows 5% of total fees for application prep); In re Love, 163 B.R. 164 (Bankr.D.Mont. 1993) (court reduced by time spent preparing billing statement).
In this case, the objectors argue that such a large request is indicative of a lack of billing judgment and an attempt to recover the previous reduction ordered by this court. The court does not doubt that the services were actually performed. But as the court in Love stated, the operative word is "reasonable." Id. at 176.
A request of nearly $10,000 to prepare and defend the second application is excessive and unreasonable. The first fee application was reduced as excessive in the first place and could not be defended. Northwestern Mutual also correctly points out that the time spent traveling to a hearing that could have been conducted by telephone, and at which counsel withdrew the application, should not be compensated. The court concludes that a reasonable number of hours incurred for the Code-required process, which is not necessarily beneficial to the estate, is 15 hours. Fees will be allowed at the blended rate of $140 Per hour for a total allowed fee of $2,100.
Finally, the objectors complain that the overall expense reimbursement sought for the computerized research is excessive. The court disagrees, concluding that computer research should be encouraged, is compensable, and in this case, is not unreasonable.
In accordance with foregoing, it is ORDERED that the third interim application of McKenna Cuneo is allowed a reasonable fee of $20,376, reimbursement of expenses of $4,474.69, for a total allowance of $24,850.69.