LEE, Justice.
In this double jeopardy case, the State of Texas appeals the granting of a writ of habeas corpus to David Eugene Rhodes on the grounds that (1) there is no evidence that the criminal prosecution in this case is based upon the same conduct for which appellee was previously held in contempt of court; and (2) a criminal contempt proceeding initiated by a private party does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct. We reverse and remand.
Appellee filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the 183rd District Court, arguing that his prosecution in cause no. 685,107 in that court was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment because he was previously adjudged guilty of contempt of court in civil cause no. 91-55293 in the 257th District Court for the same conduct. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the 183rd District Court signed an order stating only that it "granted the Writ of Habeas Corpus as to the Double Jeopardy Clause."
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence (sic) to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see also TEX.CONST. art. I, § 14; TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.10 (Vernon 1996).
In its first point of error, the State argues that, in the absence of any proof of the contents of the indictment in cause no. 685,107, there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that the criminal prosecution is based on the same conduct for which appellee was held in contempt of court. The State points out that appellee did not introduce a copy of the indictment in cause no. 685,107 or otherwise prove up the contents of the indictment which appellee claims as the basis for his double jeopardy argument. Additionally, the State contends that nothing in the record of the habeas corpus proceeding reflects the specific offense for which appellee was indicted.
During the evidentiary hearing on his application for habeas corpus relief, Appellee introduced three exhibits: (1) the divorce decree, (2) a "motion for enforcement and order to appear" filed by his former spouse, which complained of violations of the custody provisions of the divorce decree, and (3) an "order of enforcement" that recited that the Appellee had been adjudicated guilty of contempt of court for violating a provision of the divorce decree that enjoined the parties from removing their child from Harris County "for the purpose of changing the residence" of the child.
The writ of habeas corpus was brought in a separate proceeding under cause no. 707,590, rather than in the same action in which appellee had been indicted, cause no. 685,107.
Appellee responds that, at the hearing, the State did not contest that the contempt action and the indictment alleged the same conduct. Appellee further argues that the trial court has constructive knowledge of the papers on file in its other cases, such as the indictment in cause no. 685,107.
We first consider which party had the burden to bring forth a copy of the indictment at the habeas corpus hearing. Generally, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the initial burden is on the State to show that the defendant is being lawfully held. See Ex parte Williams, 587 S.W.2d 391, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). The State typically meets this prima facie burden by introducing into evidence (1) the sheriff's return, and (2) the indictment or information. See Ex parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). Only then does the burden shift to the defendant to prove that the subsequent criminal prosecution by the State puts him in double jeopardy. Hoang v. State, 810 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1991), aff'd, 872 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993).
In this case, appellee stipulated that he was the individual named in both the indictment and divorce decree and proceeded to attack the criminal prosecution as a violation of double jeopardy. By doing so, he waived the State's prima facie burden to show that he was lawfully in custody.
However, to preserve error, the complaining party must first afford the trial court an opportunity to rule on a specific complaint. TEX.R.APP.P. 52(a). After appellee waived the State's initial burden to bring forth the indictment, the State never objected to the lack of the indictment during the habeas corpus proceeding, and thus never gave the trial court an opportunity to rule on it or put a copy of the indictment in the record. By failing to object to the absence of the indictment in the trial court, the State preserved no error for appeal. See Tex.R.APP. P. 52(a). Therefore, the State's first point of error is overruled.
In its second point of error, the State argues that the trial court erred in holding that a criminal contempt proceeding initiated by a private party bars a subsequent criminal prosecution by the State for the same conduct.
A contempt finding is "criminal" if it punishes for past violations, and "civil" if it attempts to coerce future action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429-30, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988). In cause no. 91-55293, Appellee was fined $100, required to post a $2,500 bond with the court, and required to pay an additional $2,500 for his ex-wife's attorney's fees, none of which were conditional upon his performing any act in the future. Neither party contends that the contempt action in this case was civil rather than criminal.
In Ex parte Williams, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically held that a criminal contempt action brought by a private party could not prevent the sovereign from prosecuting a criminal case on behalf of the citizens of the State:
In this cause the contempt conviction was sought by a private party, not on behalf of the State. Although the power of the State was used to obtain the punishment, through the state court and jail, the State did not seek this punishment. We believe the jeopardy provisions protect only against prosecutions by persons on behalf of the same sovereign, and the contempt conviction here, while "criminal" in nature, is not the "same offense" as the [offense] the State is now seeking to prosecute. Whether the crimes would pass a
Blockburger [
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
52 S.Ct. 180,
76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) ] analysis is not relevant.
799 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Thereafter, in
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that a finding of criminal contempt for violating court orders barred subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct under the Double Jeopardy clause.
Id. at 696-99,
113 S.Ct. at 2856-57.
However, because the majority opinion in Dixon has no discussion of the "private party versus state" distinction, this panel recently held in Ex parte Jackson that nothing in Dixon was inconsistent with the "multiple sovereignty" analysis used in Williams, and, accordingly, that Williams dictated that a criminal contempt action initiated by a private party does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution by the State for the same conduct. Although the facts of Ex parte Jackson differ from those of this case in that the criminal conviction there came before the criminal contempt action, the reasoning and result are the same. In both cases, the State of Texas did not initiate or prosecute the contempt action, but only the prior or subsequent criminal conviction.
Although the "dual sovereignty" theory was briefly mentioned in a footnote of the majority opinion in Dixon, neither the majority nor concurring opinions indicate whether the majority addressed the "private party versus state" distinction.
See Ex parte Jackson, 911 S.W.2d 230, 233-34 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) ("[E]ven if the contempt offense and the criminal offense might not pass Blockburger, when contempt is sought by a private party, there is no double jeopardy bar based on the previous criminal conviction.").
The doctrine of stare decisis requires a compelling reason not to follow prior decisions of the same court. Gearheart v. State, 81 Tex.Crim. 540, 544, 197 S.W. 187, 188-189 (1917)("[W]hen a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared and uniformly followed, it should not be abandoned except upon the most urgent reasons."). See also Ex parte Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324, 328-31 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (Baird, J., dissenting). We therefore conclude, based on Jackson and Williams, that double jeopardy does not cause appellee's criminal contempt to bar his criminal prosecution for the same conduct. Accordingly, the State's second point of error is sustained, the writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.