Defendant concedes that under General Obligations Law § 11-106 Gen. Oblig., approved October 9, 1996 and effective immediately (L 1996, ch 703, §§ 5, 6), after the motion court issued the orders on appeal, the "firefighter's rule" no longer bars plaintiff's cause of action for common-law negligence, and we accordingly modify to reinstate that cause of action. However, the companion amendment adding the new subdivision (3) to General Municipal Law § 205-e (L 1996, ch 703, § 2) does not save plaintiff's cause of action under that section. Although the amendment broadened the types of statutes and regulations that can serve as predicates for liability, it remains that the injured police officer must "set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant's negligence [in failing to comply with some statute or ordinance] directly or indirectly caused the harm [that resulted]" ( Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 N.Y.2d 423, 441; see, Aversa v. New York City Hous. Auth., 233 A.D.2d 217). We agree with the motion court that the various statutes and regulations cited by plaintiff either do not afford protection to nonemployees of the violator or do not have any causal relationship to the injury sustained. We also agree with the motion court that defendant's own rules and regulations cannot serve as a predicate for liability since defendant is a public benefit corporation created by the State Legislature, not a department, division, or bureau of the Federal, State, or City government. We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Nardelli, Rubin and Williams, JJ.