Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motion and cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint are denied, and the complaint is reinstated.
There is an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff sustained a "serious injury" within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The affidavit of the plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon indicated that the surgeon had examined the plaintiff on February 11, 1993, which is the day after the accident in which the plaintiff was injured, and on January 20, 1994, and February 20, 1996. Based upon these examinations, the surgeon concluded that the plaintiff had sustained "a permanent consequential limitation of use of his lumbar spine, left shoulder and cervical spine" which were causally related to the accident, and quantified these limitations in his affidavit (see, Lopez v. Senatore, 65 N.Y.2d 1017, Washington v. Mercy Home for Children, 232 A.D.2d 549; Schwartz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 229 A.D.2d 481).
Miller, J.P., Thompson, Joy and Luciano, JJ., concur.