PER CURIAM.
Upon our conclusion that, in the circumstances of his case, the appellant Jackson became entitled to administrative gain time under section 944.276, Florida Statutes (1987) (repealed by ch. 88-122, § 6, at 527, 537, Laws of Fla.) and provisional credits under section 944.277, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988)(repealed by ch. 93-406, § 32, at 2911, 2966, Laws of Fla.), the order below denying mandamus is reversed because he was unlawfully deprived of those benefits by the enactment of section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993). Lynce v. Mathis, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); see also Orosz v. Singletary, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. Case no. 83,487, opinion filed, January 23, 1997)[22 FLW S51]. The cause is remanded for determination of the precise amount of time to which he is entitled.
We reject the appellee's claim that the appeal is untimely.