Upon pleading guilty to murder in the second degree, defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 20 years to life. Defendant now contends on appeal that his plea was not knowing and voluntary as it was obtained by duress. As defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate the judgment of conviction, he has failed to preserve this claim for our review ( see, People v. Russell, 237 A.D.2d 841; People v. Tien, 228 A.D.2d 280, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 970). In any event, defendant's claim is unavailing. A review of the record indicates that defendant was fully informed of the implications of pleading guilty and he was afforded an opportunity to discuss the matter with his counsel and members of his family. Defendant expressed that he understood these admonitions, he was not forced into making the plea and he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. As such, his plea was knowing and voluntary ( see, People v. Comer, 236 A.D.2d 658; People v. Goss, 229 A.D.2d 791, 793). Finally, defendant's challenge to the harshness of his sentence has also not been preserved for our review in light of his waiver of the right to appeal as part of his knowing, voluntary and intelligent guilty plea ( see, People v. James, 238 A.D.2d 620; People v. Sullivan, 223 A.D.2d 893). Nevertheless, were we to consider the merits of this claim, we would conclude that defendant's sentence was neither harsh nor excessive in view of the heinous nature of his crime and the fact that the sentence was in accordance with the plea agreement ( see, People v. Nardi, 232 A.D.2d 673, 674, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 927; People v. Shuman, 213 A.D.2d 902, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 741).
Mikoll, J. P., Mercure, Casey, Yesawich Jr. and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.