Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the third-party plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to amend the third-party complaint by adding a demand for punitive damages is denied.
Although leave to amend a pleading is generally liberally granted (see, McCaskey, Davies Assocs. v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 755, 757; CPLR 3025 [b]), if the proposed amendment is patently lacking in merit or its lack of merit is clear and free from doubt, it will not be permitted and leave should be denied as a matter of law (see, McKiernan v. McKiernan, 207 A.D.2d 825; Staines v. Nassau Queens Med. Group, 176 A.D.2d 718).
In the instant case, the third-party plaintiffs failed to present "`sufficient evidentiary allegations of ultimate facts of a fraudulent and deceitful scheme in dealing with the general public"' (Valis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 A.D.2d 658, 659, quoting Holoness Realty Corp. v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 75 A.D.2d 569, 570), or conduct "so `willful and wanton', outrageously immoral, or criminal as to warrant an award of punitive damages" (Kelly v. DeFoe Corp., 223 A.D.2d 529, 530; see, Gilbin v. Murphy, 73 N.Y.2d 769; Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401; Sforza v. Health Ins. Plan, 210 A.D.2d 214).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the third-party plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to amend the third-party complaint by adding a demand for punitive damages.
Mangano, P.J., Ritter, Sullivan, Altman and McGinity, JJ., concur.