Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
This legal malpractice action arose out of the defendants' representation of the plaintiff in a wrongful death action. Contrary to the defendants' contention, the complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite three elements of a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice ( see, Mendoza v Schlossman, 87 A.D.2d 606, 607).
The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issues involved in the underlying wrongful death action. To apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, two requirements must be satisfied: "[f]irst, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded * * * must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination" ( Kaufman v Eli Lilly Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 465; see, D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659, 665-666). The defendants failed to demonstrate that either of these requirements have been satisfied.
We have considered the defendants' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Rosenblatt, J.P., Thompson, Pizzuto and Altman, JJ., concur.