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MADDOX v. STATE — Supreme Court of Arkansas (No. 4640)

Opinion delivered November 6, 1950. Appeal from Miller Circuit Court; Dexter Bush, Judge; affirmed. Chief Justice: Griffin Smith.

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 19, 1949, Carl Maddox shot and mortally wounded Collins Sheppard. Maddox, owner of a cafe and night club on Highway 71 near the Louisiana line, was tried in Miller Circuit Court and found guilty of murder in the second degree; he was sentenced to 18 years in the penitentiary. The events occurred about 2:00 a.m. when Sheppard and several companions arrived at Maddox's establishment, which the State's witnesses described as lighted inside and out and containing other patrons. According to State testimony, Sheppard knocked at the locked door, Maddox told him the place was closed, and after a second knock Maddox opened the door; testimony from the State permitted the jury to find Sheppard stepped toward Maddox and Maddox then fired one shot. Witnesses for the State agreed Sheppard was unarmed, did not use unusual force in knocking, and made no threats; the shot struck Sheppard in the abdomen and he died before medical attention could be rendered.

Under the defense theory, the newcomers were told the place was closed by employees, Sheppard kicked and attempted to force entry, shoved his foot through a partly opened door, and in response Maddox produced a pistol as a "bluff." Maddox testified a scuffle for the pistol ensued and the weapon was accidentally discharged while he was trying to free himself. At trial the judge questioned Maddox, who unequivocally stated he did not intend to fire the shot and that he "stand[s] or fall[s]" on the claim the gun went off accidentally. The jury convicted; Maddox appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing instructions specifically on self-defense.
  2. Whether it was error to permit cross-examination asking the defendant whether, about a month earlier, he had killed another man with a baseball bat, where the court limited the use of the answer to testing the defendant's credibility.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (Maddox) contended he was entitled to instructions specifically dealing with self-defense (notably Instructions No. 9, 10, and 11), relying on his testimony that the shooting was accidental and that he had presented the pistol as a bluff because he feared bodily harm when Sheppard attempted forcible entry.
  • The appellant objected to cross-examination about a prior killing in his place of business and requested a mistrial when asked whether he had killed a man with a baseball bat approximately one month earlier.

Appellee's (State's) Position as Reflected in the Record

  • State witnesses testified that Sheppard and his companions arrived at the club after 2 a.m., found the door locked, were told the place was closed, and that Sheppard did not use unusual force or make threats before Maddox opened the door and fired. The evidence permitted the jury to find that Sheppard stepped toward Maddox and was not farther than four to eight feet away when shot.
  • On cross-examination the Prosecuting Attorney sought to impeach Maddox's credibility by asking about a prior killing; the court allowed the question for credibility purposes and instructed the jury to consider any answer only for that limited purpose.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the evidentiary posture and the defenses presented. Key points in the analysis were:

  • The trial judge directly interrogated Maddox about his intent and received unequivocal testimony that Maddox did not intend to fire the pistol and that he relied on the assertion the gun went off accidentally in the scuffle. The court emphasized that Maddox "stand[s] or fall[s]" on that claim.
  • Because Maddox's testimony was a clear, consistent assertion that the killing was accidental (rather than an intentional use of deadly force in self-defense), the trial court did not err in refusing the specific self-defense instructions sought by the appellant. The court viewed those requested instructions as inconsistent with Maddox's positive testimony that the shooting was accidental.
  • The court noted Instruction "A" given by the trial judge explicitly tracked the defendant's theory: it advised the jury that if they found Sheppard undertook to force his way in and the defendant presented a pistol to prevent forcible entry, and a scuffle ensued over the pistol and it was accidentally fired resulting in Sheppard's death, then the jury should acquit. The opinion found that this instruction was responsive to the defendant's theory of the case.
  • Regarding cross-examination about a prior killing, the court reasoned that the prosecutor's question was permissible for the limited purpose of testing the witness's credibility. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the answer only for credibility; the defendant admitted the prior killing. The appellate court held that allowing the question under that limiting instruction was not error.
  • The court concluded other objections raised on appeal were non-prejudicial and did not warrant reversal.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Holding: The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the conviction and 18-year sentence for second-degree murder. The court held that (1) refusal to give the requested self-defense instructions was proper where the defendant repeatedly and unequivocally testified the shooting was accidental and (2) permitting cross-examination about a prior killing for impeachment purposes, coupled with a limiting instruction to the jury that the evidence was to be used only to assess credibility, was not reversible error.

Implications: The direct effect is that Maddox's conviction and sentence were upheld. The opinion does not announce or rely upon any newly stated legal precedent beyond applying these principles to the particular facts; no broader rule was expressly established in the opinion.

MADDOX v. STATE

1. CRIMINAL LAW — INSTRUCTIONS — SELF-DEFENSE. — The defendant, B, owner of a night club, was consorting with relatives and friends within the fully lighted building at 2 a.m. on the night of tragedy. He insists that A as leader of a party of five undertook to gain admittance after an explanation had been repeated that the place was closed. It was further claimed that in the effort to enter, A kicked the door and was engaged in other turbulent acts when B went to the door that had been slightly opened by a woman attendant. B insists that A pushed his foot through the opening, whereupon he (B) presented a pistol, intending only to frighten the intruder. B further testified that in scuffling for possession of the weapon it was accidentally discharged, mortally wounding A. The trial judge carefully interrogated B on this phase of the alleged engagement, and B emphasized his contention that the killing was accidental. Held, that with these assertions by B so positively and emphatically expressed, the court was justified in refusing an instruction on self-defense. 2. CRIMINAL LAW — CROSS-EXAMINATION — FORMER CRIMES. — The Prosecuting Attorney, in cross-examining the defendant, asked whether, about a month ago, he had killed a man with a baseball bat. In response to an objection the court instructed that the necessary answers were to be considered only in determining credibility of the witness. This was not error.

GRIFFIN SMITH, Chief Justice.

November 19, 1949, Carl Maddox shot and mortally wounded Collins Sheppard, 26 years of age. The circumstances were such that when tried the defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree and sentenced to a term of 18 years in the penitentiary.

Witnesses introduced by the State testified that C. L. O'Donnell and Collins Sheppard had been together until nine o'clock in the evening, when they met Wren Sheppard and Julius Wynn at Cool Point. Collins and Wren Sheppard were brothers. Using Wynn's car they drove to the cafe and night club owned and operated by Maddox on Highway 71 near the Louisiana line, reaching the place shortly after two a.m. In the meantime they had been joined by Kathryn Schoolfield.

Wren Sheppard, Wynn, and O'Donnell testified in substance that while at Cool Point they concluded to drive to Maddox' place for coffee. There they parked about forty feet from the club. Other automobiles were to be seen, and the premises were lighted inside and out. Ten or twelve people, presumed to be customers, were in the building. When Collins Sheppard, walking in front of his companions, reached a small front porch at the main entrance it was found that the door was locked. In response to Collins' knock, Maddox came to the door and said the place was closed, then returned to his friends within. Collins knocked a second time and according to at least two of the witnesses he had turned to walk away when Maddox reappeared and opened the door. Under testimony from which the jury could have believed that Collins thought that the club owner, in opening the door, had reconsidered the original rejection, he (Collins) turned and took a step toward Maddox. The latter fired one shot from a pistol, then withdrew to a position near the wall, where he brandished the weapon and warned incomers not to molest him.

At the time the shot was fired Collins was not less than four nor more than eight feet from his adversary. It was not contended that Collins was armed, and those who testified for the State agreed that the would-be patron did not use unusual force in knocking on the door, and that there were no threats. The wounded man was taken to a doctor, but was dead before attention could be given. He was shot "in the stomach about an inch from the navel," said one of the witnesses.

State witnesses differed in their estimates of the distance separating the two men.

The defense contended, and at least inferentially suggested, that the four men were under the influence of intoxicants. It was claimed that the newcomers were politely told — first by Betty Carroll (an employee) and then by "Patsy" (one of Maddox' daughters) — that the place was closed. Finally, when Sheppard and his friends persisted in entering, and when Collins kicked and threatened to kill all who were within, Maddox went to the door, partially opened by Patsy. Collins had taken advantage of Patsy's courteous attitude and actions to shove his foot through the partly opened door in an effort to force an entrance. After Collins and his companions had kicked for some time, the door "flew open" and Collins was in the act of forcing his way in. Maddox insists that he had put a pistol in his pocket as a precautionary measure, not intending to use it. But, thinking he could "bluff" Collins, Maddox drew the weapon and they scuffled for possession of it. Then, said the defendant, "because I was afraid he would hurt me I jerked the gun down to get loose from him, and it [was accidentally] discharged."

At another point in his testimony Maddox said: "When [Collins] kicked the door open and put one foot in, then is when I put the gun on him. He jumped at me and grabbed it, and I stooped over. He was stronger than I am, and I was afraid of him; so I jerked the gun down like this (indicating) to get loose from him, and that is when it fired."

Appellant complains that he was entitled to an instruction dealing specifically with self-defense. In trying to clarify the issues Judge Bush said: "Mr. Maddox, there is one thing I would like for you to clear up for me: Is it your testimony that you didn't intend to fire the shot?" A. "No, I didn't." Q. "[You contend] that the gun went off accidentally?" A. "Yes, sir, in the scuffle." Q. "You stand or fall on that statement, do you?" A. "Yes, sir."

Certain suggested instructions dealing specifically with self-defense are thought by appellant to have been erroneously refused, particularly No. 9, No. 10, and No. 11. But if it be conceded that the effect of testimony given by Maddox was that he attempted to use the gun as a "bluff" because he feared bodily injury, the Court's Instruction "A" correctly told the jury that if it should find from the evidence ". . . that the deceased, in a violent, riotous and turbulent manner undertook to force his way into the restaurant of the defendant, then the defendant would have a right to use a show of force to prevent such forcible entry by the deceased, and if the deceased did so undertake to force his way into the restaurant and the defendant presented a pistol in order to prevent his act of forcibly entering, and a scuffle ensued over the pistol and the pistol was accidentally fired and [Sheppard] was killed, you will acquit the defendant." This instruction was responsive to the defendant's own theory of the tragedy.

Another objection was to the Court's refusal to halt the Prosecuting Attorney on cross-examination of Maddox, and not to require an answer to the inquiry: "About a month before this happened didn't you kill another man down there in your place of business [by using a baseball bat?"]. Responding to the defendant's request for a mistrial, the Court ruled that the question could be answered only to test the defendant's credibility, and the jury was instructed not to consider the interrogation or reply for any other purpose. Maddox admitted that he had killed a man named Phillips in the manner mentioned and at the time referred to.

Other objections are made, but we are in accord that none of the assignments is prejudicial, hence the judgment must be affirmed.

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MADDOX v. STATE
(Nov 6, 1950)