Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive given that it took place within 40 minutes after the incident and within approximately 200 feet of the crime scene ( see, Matter of Brian D., 237 A.D.2d 355). That the appellant was accompanied by the police when the complainant viewed him does not render the showup identification suggestive ( see, Matter of Sharrod J., 205 A.D.2d 628; see also, People v. Rosa, 231 A.D.2d 534; People v Johnson, 220 A.D.2d 775; People v. Bitz, 209 A.D.2d 709). Upon the unequivocal identification of the appellant by the complainant, the police had probable cause to arrest him ( see, People v Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458).
The finding of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15). Moreover, the only crime mentioned in the order of disposition and the fact-finding order is robbery in the second degree, and the only penal statute recited in those orders is Penal Law § 160.10 (1), which defines robbery in the second degree. Consequently, there is no merit to the appellant's contention that the court improperly failed to dismiss certain offenses as lesser-included offenses of robbery in the second degree.
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.
Rosenblatt, J.P., Ritter, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.