Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Richard H. Johnston, for appellant. Ansell T. Maund III, for appellee.
Judges
  • CARLEY, Justice.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Richard H. Johnston, for appellant. Ansell T. Maund III, for appellee.
Judges
  • CARLEY, Justice.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Horton v. Horton, S97A1910 — Supreme Court of Georgia (Dec. 17, 1997)

Factual and Procedural Background

Ms. Carolyn Horton, diagnosed with terminal cancer, died on September 21, 1994. Her survivors were two sons: Richard I. Horton, Jr. (Propounder) and Robert G. Horton (Caveator). A purported will dated August 25, 1994, named Propounder as executor and left all of Ms. Horton's property to him, excluding Caveator. Propounder offered the will for probate in Fulton Probate Court. Caveator challenged the will's validity on several grounds. At trial, a jury found the will invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. Propounder appealed, arguing that there was no evidence to support the jury's verdict and that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Ms. Horton lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed the will.
  2. Whether, assuming insufficient evidence of capacity, it was necessary to address the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's finding of undue influence.

Arguments of the Parties

Propounder's Arguments

  • Propounder contended that there was no evidence to support the jury's verdict that the will was invalid.
  • He specifically enumerated as error the trial court's denial of his motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of Caveator's specific trial or appellate arguments beyond the fact that Caveator challenged the will on several grounds and prevailed at trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Estate of Harris, 251 Ga. 535 (307 S.E.2d 482) (1983) Permits subscribing witnesses to give opinion testimony about a testator's sanity without detailing the facts underlying those opinions. Used to justify considering the subscribing witnesses' opinion testimony that Ms. Horton lacked capacity.
Franklin v. First Nat. Bank, 187 Ga. 268, 274 (200 S.E. 679) (1938) Supports the principle that subscribing witnesses may give opinion testimony concerning sanity. Cited as consistent authority for allowing subscribing-witness opinions about mental capacity.
Spivey v. Spivey, 202 Ga. 644, 649 (44 S.E.2d 224) (1947) Holds that testimony by subscribing witnesses adverse to propounder does not necessarily defeat a will, but it authorizes a jury to find lack of capacity. Applied to explain that the witnesses' adverse testimony authorized the jury to conclude lack of testamentary capacity.
Dunn v. Sneed, 260 Ga. 763 (400 S.E.2d 10) (1991) Illustrates that medical testimony alone can be sufficient to support a finding of lack of testamentary capacity. Used to support the point that Dr. Feinberg's testimony alone could authorize the finding of incapacity.
Mallis v. Miltiades, 241 Ga. 404 (245 S.E.2d 655) (1978) Authority that medical evidence may suffice to show lack of testamentary capacity. Supported the court's conclusion that the doctor's testimony authorized the verdict independent of witness testimony.
Helton v. Zellmer, 238 Ga. 735 (235 S.E.2d 35) (1977) Similar precedent on the sufficiency of medical testimony regarding testamentary capacity. Cited in the line of cases showing a doctor's testimony could justify a finding of incapacity.
Leventhal v. Baumgartner, 207 Ga. 412, 415 (61 S.E.2d 810) (1950) Another case supporting the sufficiency of medical testimony to prove incapacity. Included among cases the court relied on to show that the doctor's opinion could alone authorize the jury's verdict.
Thompson v. Mitchell, 192 Ga. 750, 752, 753 (16 S.E.2d 540) (1941) Holds that, when reviewing sufficiency of evidence, the appellate court considers only the evidence favorable to the party prevailing at trial. Applied to justify viewing only evidence favorable to Caveator when determining whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
Borenstein v. Blumenfeld, 250 Ga. 606, 609 (5) (299 S.E.2d 727) (1983) States that if sufficient evidence supports one ground for invalidating a will (e.g., lack of capacity), an appellate court need not address other grounds (e.g., undue influence). Invoked to explain why the court did not reach Propounder's contentions concerning undue influence after finding sufficient evidence of lack of capacity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. It summarized testimony unfavorable to Propounder: two subscribing witnesses testified that, at execution, Ms. Horton appeared very ill, "real sick," "comatose almost," "very out of it," with blank or glassy stares and was not mentally competent. Dr. Bruce Feinberg, who treated Ms. Horton, testified that she had been discharged five days before the will's execution with a diagnosis of underlying dementia and was readmitted less than a month later with progression of dysfunction; he stated it would be "extremely surprising" if she had normal mental capacity on the day of the will's execution.

The court applied established Georgia law permitting subscribing witnesses to give opinion testimony about a testator's sanity without detailing underlying facts (In re Estate of Harris; Franklin). It acknowledged that adverse testimony by subscribing witnesses does not automatically defeat a will (Spivey), but such testimony can authorize a jury to find lack of testamentary capacity. The court further noted that the doctor's testimony independently authorized the jury's finding of incapacity, citing prior cases where medical testimony sufficed (Dunn, Mallis, Helton, Leventhal).

In conducting its sufficiency review, the court followed the rule that only the evidence favorable to the prevailing party (here, Caveator) need be considered (Thompson v. Mitchell). Because that evidence was "clearly sufficient," the court affirmed the judgment. Finally, because the court found sufficient evidence of lack of testamentary capacity, it declined to address Propounder's arguments concerning undue influence, per controlling authority (Borenstein v. Blumenfeld).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment entered on the jury's verdict finding the will invalid for lack of testamentary capacity. Judgment affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the probate of the August 25, 1994 instrument was rejected and the jury's determination that Ms. Horton lacked testamentary capacity was upheld. The court relied on witness and medical testimony and applied existing precedent; it did not announce a new legal rule or broader precedent beyond application of established Georgia authority. Because the court found sufficient evidence of lack of capacity, it did not decide the sufficiency of evidence on undue influence.

Show full summary ...

HORTON v. HORTON

CARLEY, Justice.

Ms. Carolyn Horton was diagnosed with terminal cancer and died two months later on September 21, 1994. Her survivors were her sons, Richard I. Horton, Jr. (Propounder) and Robert G. Horton (Caveator). Ms. Horton's purported will, dated August 25, 1994, named Propounder as executor and devised and bequeathed all of her property to him, to the exclusion of Caveator. After Propounder offered Ms. Horton's will for probate, Caveator challenged its validity on several grounds. At trial, the jury found that Ms. Horton's will was invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. Propounder appeals from the judgment entered by the trial court on the jury's verdict. Contending that there was no evidence to support the verdict, Propounder enumerates as error the trial court's denial of his motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

1. Construed most favorably in support of the verdict, the evidence of testamentary incapacity includes the following: One of the subscribing witnesses, Rebecca McDaniel, testified that, at the time of execution of the will, Ms. Horton did not appear to be of sound and disposing mind and memory, but was "real sick," "so sick she didn't know what was going on," had "a blank stare," and apparently did not recognize McDaniel. The other subscribing witness, Jane Reeves, testified that Ms. Horton "was not aware of much of anything," "comatose almost," "very out of it" with "very glassy" eyes, and was not mentally competent. Dr. Bruce Feinberg treated Ms. Horton at the hospital before and after the execution of the will. He testified that she was discharged five days before execution of the will with a diagnosis of underlying dementia, which is incurable, and that she was readmitted less than one month later with progression of dysfunction. In the doctor's opinion, it would be extremely surprising if Ms. Horton had normal mental capacity at any time on the day of the execution of the will.

Subscribing witnesses to a will may give their opinions as to the sanity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will without setting forth facts upon which such opinions are founded. In re Estate of Harris, 251 Ga. 535 (1) ( 307 S.E.2d 482) (1983). See also Franklin v. First Nat. Bank, 187 Ga. 268, 274 (8) ( 200 S.E. 679) (1938). Cases relied on by Propounder "do not contradict this principle because they relate to witnesses other than subscribing witnesses. [Cit.]" In re Estate of Harris, supra.

Where, as here, the subscribing witnesses give testimony as to testamentary capacity and mental condition of the testator, which is adverse to the propounder and favorable to the caveator, such evidence will not necessarily defeat the will. Spivey v. Spivey, 202 Ga. 644, 649 (1) ( 44 S.E.2d 224) (1947). However, such testimony certainly authorizes a jury to conclude that the testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time of execution of the will. Moreover, this conclusion was authorized by the testimony of Dr. Feinberg even without the testimony of the subscribing witnesses. See Dunn v. Sneed, 260 Ga. 763 ( 400 S.E.2d 10) (1991); Mallis v. Miltiades, 241 Ga. 404 ( 245 S.E.2d 655) (1978); Helton v. Zellmer, 238 Ga. 735 ( 235 S.E.2d 35) (1977); Leventhal v. Baumgartner, 207 Ga. 412, 415 ( 61 S.E.2d 810) (1950). It is immaterial that testimony of Propounder and of a doctor who did not treat Ms. Horton may have authorized a finding in Propounder's favor. Only the testimony favorable to Caveator need be considered, because the sole question before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. Thompson v. Mitchell, 192 Ga. 750, 752, 753 ( 16 S.E.2d 540) (1941). Because the evidence was clearly sufficient in this case, we affirm the judgment entered on the verdict of the jury. See Thompson v. Mitchell, supra.

2. Because there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of lack of testamentary capacity, we need not address Propounder's contentions relative to the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize a finding of undue influence. Borenstein v. Blumenfeld, 250 Ga. 606, 609 (5) ( 299 S.E.2d 727) (1983).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

CARLEY, Justice.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 17, 1997 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED DECEMBER 19, 1997.
Use AI to get other relevant cases.
Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

Comments

HORTON v. HORTON
(Nov 17, 1997)