Notwithstanding appellant's subsequent untimely objection, the record establishes that she consented to the one-day adjournment of the fact-finding hearing beyond the prescribed 60 day period (Family Ct Act § 340.1, [4] [a]) due to the unavailability of a court reporter, thereby waiving her speedy trial claim (see, Matter of Carlos T., 187 A.D.2d 38, 41-42; see also, Matter of Din C., 240 A.D.2d 341). In any event, the adjournment was supported by good cause (see, Matter of Jamell H., 219 A.D.2d 531). Special circumstances (see, Family Ct Act § 340.1) were demonstrated concerning the second one-day adjournment where, although the presentment agency would have proceeded on the first court date, but for the unavailability of the reporter, its witness became unavailable the next day due to a medical condition (see, Matter of Carlos T., 187 A.D.2d 38, supra). We have considered appellant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Wallach, Nardelli and Colabella, JJ.