Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the initial stop made by the police was based on reasonable suspicion. The trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the identification testimony and physical evidence which was derived from the stop ( see, People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210; People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106).
However, the defendant is correct in his contention that his right to a public trial was violated by the exclusion of his brother from the courtroom during the jury charge. Once the defendant objected to the prosecutor's application to exclude his brother, it was incumbent upon the prosecutor to demonstrate that an overriding interest was likely to be prejudiced by his presence ( see, People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436; People v Kin Kan, 78 N.Y.2d 54; People v. Clemons, 78 N.Y.2d 48; People v Mateo, 73 N.Y.2d 928; People v. Warren O., 86 A.D.2d 895). The speculative conclusion that the brother's presence would have misled or confused the jury in some manner was insufficient to warrant his exclusion.
Ritter, J. P., Friedmann, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.