Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the plaintiffs' cross motion which was for partial summary judgment is denied, and the counterclaim is reinstated.
On September 11, 1993, a sanitation truck operated by the defendant Hervin S. Gayle struck the rear end of the vehicle operated by plaintiff Joy LaFond. The LaFond vehicle had stopped suddenly because of a disabled and abandoned vehicle in the road. In a police accident report Gayle stated that he was unable to avoid the collision because the LaFond vehicle stopped suddenly on a blind curve.
Proof of a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of liability on the part of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty of explanation on the part of the driver of the moving vehicle ( see, Gladstone v. Hachuel, 225 A.D.2d 730; Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635; Leal v. Wolff 224 A.D.2d 392). However, under the particular circumstances of this case, there exist triable issues of fact concerning the reasonableness of Gayle's conduct ( see, Barber v. Young, 238 A.D.2d 822; Varsi v. Stoll, 161 A.D.2d 590; Rios v. Nicoletta, 119 A.D.2d 562; Pescetti v. Mastrodominico, 79 A.D.2d 970, affd 54 N.Y.2d 633).
Rosenblatt, J. P., O'Brien, Thompson, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.