Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
To establish a prima facie case of negligence in a "slip and fall" case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant either created the condition which caused the accident, or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and a reasonable time within which to correct it or warn about its existence ( see, Bykofsky v. Waldbaum's Supermarkets, 210 A.D.2d 280; Lewis v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 99 A.D.2d 246, affd 64 N.Y.2d 670; Madrid v. City of New York, 53 A.D.2d 517, affd 42 N.Y.2d 1039). The only issue on this appeal involves constructive notice. To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be visible and apparent, and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit discovery and a remedy ( see, Lewis v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., supra, at 249). Moreover, a "general awareness" that a dangerous condition may be present is legally insufficient to constitute notice of the particular condition that caused an injury ( see, Piacquadio v. Recine Realty Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 967, 968).
The plaintiffs failed to submit admissible evidence that rain water had accumulated on the floor of the defendant's store for a sufficient length of time prior to the plaintiffs' decedent's accident, so as to charge the defendant with constructive notice of a dangerous condition. Without evidence legally sufficient to permit a jury to rationally infer that the defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition, the defendant cannot be held liable for failure to warn or to remedy the defect.
Bracken, J. P., O'Brien, Thompson and Altman, JJ., concur.