Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which granted the third-party plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed.
CPLR 3215 (f) provides in pertinent part as follows: "On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proof * * * by affidavit * * * made by the party of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due. Where a verified complaint has been served it may be used as the affidavit of the facts" (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that the the third-party plaintiff, Bruno Purins, failed to submit an affidavit of facts in conjunction with his motion for leave to enter a default judgment under CPLR 3215. It is also undisputed that at the time the complaint was served upon the third-party defendants, it was not verified. Purins' belated attempt to render that complaint verified by furnishing a "verification" to the court, after the motion for leave to enter a default judgment had been submitted, does not satisfy the criteria of CPLR 3215 (f), especially since there is no proof that this verification was ever served upon the third-party defendants. In any event, since Purins' verification was premised solely upon "information and belief)', the complaint remained unverified and as such it was insufficient to support the entry of a default judgment ( see, Zelnik v. Bidermann Indus., 242 A.D.2d 227; CPLR 3215 [f]). Accordingly, in the absence of either a verified complaint or an affidavit by Purins, leave to enter a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 should not have been granted ( see, Hazim v. Winter, 234 A.D.2d 422; Goodyear v. Weinstein, 224 A.D.2d 387; Mullins v. DiLorenzo, 199 A.D.2d 218, 220; Joosten v. Gale, 129 A.D.2d 531).
Although the third-party plaintiff Purins has not shown on these papers that he is entitled to a default judgment, nevertheless, there is no basis to grant the third-party defendants leave to interpose a late answer since they have not demonstrated a reasonable excuse for their default or a meritorious defense ( see, Dowling Textile Mfg. Co. v. Land, 179 A.D.2d 621). Purins may renew his motion for leave to enter a default judgment upon proper papers ( see, Hazim v. Winter, supra).
Pizzuto, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.