JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE
Melvin Alexander Moore, appellant, was convicted of statutory rape of a six-year old girl in violation of Code § 18.2-61(A)(iii). On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing a mental health therapist "to testify as an expert witness on the credibility of the [victim] and on the probability of the incident occurring based on certain hypothetical questions tracking the [victim]'s symptoms." For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial judge.
I.
The victim was fifteen years old at the time of the trial. She testified that when she was six years old she had a sexual encounter with appellant, who had been dating the victim's mother. The victim testified that appellant "held his penis with one of his hands and he rubbed it on the inside of my vagina . . . ." The next day the victim told her babysitter "that [appellant] had made love to [her]." She was upset and cried as she disclosed the incident to the babysitter. She then told her mother about the incident, but her mother did not believe her and did not take her to a doctor.
The victim testified that after the incident, when appellant visited her home, she hid under the bed, in the closet, or behind other furniture. The victim became upset at television shows that depicted rape or sexual molestation. She often cried about the incident and, at one time, took an overdose of aspirin.
In September, 1993, about nine years after the incident, the victim saw appellant at a laundromat. She became upset and left the building, although she had not seen appellant since 1984. The victim testified that she cried, wished she was dead, and asked herself why the incident had to happen to her. Her mother took her to the hospital, where she was referred to the Appomattox Counseling Center.
The victim began seeing Carol DePew, a mental health therapist. She met with DePew for a total of eleven sessions. DePew has an undergraduate degree in psychology and a masters degree in mental health counseling. She has "a National Counseling Certification which is a five year renewable license to be continued with 100 continued education hours of which [she] ha[d] earned 50." She has attended professional seminars on such topics as working with sexual abuse survivors. DePew testified she has "done extensive professional reading of books and journals on topics relevant to working with adolescents and families and [has] five years of professional experience in therapy primarily working with children and families." DePew stated that one-third to one-half of her caseload involves children who have been sexually abused.
DePew was qualified as an expert witness over appellant's objection. Appellant argued to the trial court that DePew's testimony was inadmissible because it would address the ultimate issue in the case — the credibility of the victim. However, the trial court ruled that DePew could testify, stating:
[T]he Court would not allow the witness to give an opinion as to the ultimate fact in issue. That is in her opinion whether or not this child on the occasion was sexually abused or not. That is an issue for the jury to draw from all the evidence. However, I assume what the Commonwealth is about to do is to relate certain behavioral happenings and characteristics and ask the witness whether that type of behavior is consistent with a child who has been sexually abused. I don't think the response to that, assuming it would be an affirmative one based upon the facts that the Commonwealth would give, would go to invading the province of the jury in deciding the ultimate issue. I think it would be probative here. We have something that happened some nine years ago. Basically, the case comes down to the testimony of the young lady at this juncture as would be opposed by testimony of the defendant if he testifies. But, basically, it's coming down to the testimony of what the young lady has to say. This could be helpful to the jury in deciding whether or not she is telling the truth. Something that the jury could consider other than their observation of her manner and demeanor and responses here today.
At the trial, DePew testified in response to hypothetical questions. She listed the following as "pretty common" symptoms of sexual abuse victims: crying; expressing painful or negative emotions in inappropriate fashions; becoming upset in a manner that is not rational or reasonable to others, such as when seeing something on television reminiscent of the event; safety seeking behavior such as hiding; overdose or suicide attempts; and panic attacks upon seeing the perpetrator. She testified that one of the strongest indicators of sexual abuse was when the victim remembered the exact event even though it occurred many years ago.
Appellant testified and denied any sexual activity with the victim.
II.
"The admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988) (citation omitted).
Relying on Davison v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 496, 445 S.E.2d 683 (1994), appellant argues that DePew's testimony impermissibly bolstered the credibility of the victim and offered conclusions as to the ultimate issue in the case. However, DePew's testimony differed from the testimony offered by the expert witness in Davison. In Davison, the expert witness, a therapist, testified concerning the "phenomenon of recanting" to explain why the victim, a child, would relate prior inconsistent statements that contradicted both the victim's trial testimony and the victim's original version of a sexual assault. Id. at 498-99, 445 S.E.2d at 684-85. We held that the trial court erred in admitting the therapist's testimony because she offered an opinion as to why the victim's testimony at trial should be believed and why the victim's prior inconsistent statement should be disbelieved. Id. at 503-04, 445 S.E.2d at 687.
The testimony of DePew is more analogous to the expert witness testimony offered in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1996). In Taylor, a licensed clinical social worker testified that she " 'found [the victim] to be suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder,' explained how she reached her diagnosis from the symptoms that the victim related, and testified that posttraumatic stress disorder may afflict 'anyone who has had a traumatic event outside of normal human experience that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone.' " Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. The expert witness also identified criteria necessary to diagnose posttraumatic stress disorder, applied the criteria to the victim, and expressed her professional opinion that "the victim demonstrated the requisite number of criteria to support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder." Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.
This Court rejected Taylor's assertion that the expert witness' testimony "constituted a comment on the victim's credibility." Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. We held:
[E]vidence of an emotional or psychological injury such as posttraumatic stress disorder, like medical evidence of physical injury, is relevant as circumstantial evidence of the occurrence of a traumatizing event. In this case, [the expert witness'] testimony corroborated the fact that the victim had suffered a traumatizing event, as evidenced by her mental condition, and constituted neither the expression of an opinion on the victim's credibility, nor an opinion as to which version of events should be accepted by the jury.
Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.
An expert in a criminal case "may give an opinion based [only] upon his own knowledge of facts disclosed in his testimony or . . . upon facts in evidence assumed in a hypothetical question," but the witness may not express an opinion as to the ultimate issue to be determined by the trier of fact.
Price,
18 Va. App. at 764, 446 S.E.2d at 645 (citations omitted).
See also Price v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 760, 765, 446 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1994) (holding that an expert witness' testimony concerning battered child syndrome " 'is not an opinion regarding the culpability of any particular defendant. . . . [It] merely tends to show that the child was intentionally, rather than accidentally, injured.' " (citation omitted)).
In this case, DePew responded only to hypothetical questions concerning the symptoms related to sexual abuse. She also testified that victims "could easily have a panic attack" when they encountered their offender, even years after a traumatizing incident. DePew did not enumerate any details of the incident that the victim may have related to her in therapy sessions. Further, DePew did not testify that she believed the victim was telling the truth, or that, in her opinion, appellant committed the charged offense. DePew merely responded to hypothetical questions that certain behavior was consistent with that of a sexually abused child. Therefore, DePew's testimony corroborated the fact that the victim had been sexually abused and "constituted neither the expression of an opinion on the victim's credibility, nor an opinion as to which version of events should be accepted by the jury."See Taylor, 21 Va. App. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.Affirmed.