REYNOLDS v. STATE

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Docket Number

A97A2024.

Attorney(S)

Sidney L. Moore, Jr., for appellant. Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor, Richard E. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.

Judges

Judge Harold R. Banke.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

John C. Reynolds was convicted in Gwinnett State Court of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), driving with unlawful alcohol concentration, and failure to maintain his lane. The arresting officer observed Reynolds' truck drifting outside its lane on an interstate highway. Upon stopping Reynolds, the officer detected signs of intoxication including the smell of alcohol, slurred speech, flushed face, watery eyes, and Reynolds' admission to having consumed one drink. After administering field sobriety tests, Reynolds was arrested and taken to the station where breath tests recorded blood alcohol concentrations of .145 and .149. The case proceeded through trial, resulting in convictions on the charges stated.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the admission of certificates showing proper inspection, testing, and standardization of the breath testing device violated the rule against hearsay due to lack of proper foundation.
Whether the admission of the certificate of inspection violated Reynolds' right to confrontation.
Whether the trial court erred in denying Reynolds' motion for directed verdict on the charge of driving with unlawful blood alcohol content.
Whether the jury charge on expert witnesses was incomplete for failing to state that the jury was not bound by unopposed expert testimony.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Reddin v. State, 223 Ga. App. 148, 152-153 (476 S.E.2d 882) (1996)	Requirement to object to foundation adequacy for hearsay evidence to preserve error.	The court held that Reynolds waived the objection regarding foundation adequacy because he did not timely object.
McGee v. State, 205 Ga. App. 722, 729 (423 S.E.2d 666) (1992)	Waiver of evidentiary objections due to failure to timely object.	Supported waiver of Reynolds' hearsay objection due to lack of timely foundation objection.
Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 81 (485 S.E.2d 486) (1997)	Confrontation Clause considerations regarding admission of certificates of inspection.	Foreclosed Reynolds' claim that admission of the certificate violated his confrontation rights.
Carter v. State, 222 Ga. App. 397 (474 S.E.2d 228) (1996)	Standard for reviewing denial of directed verdict of acquittal as equivalent to sufficiency of evidence review.	Supported the court's conclusion that evidence was sufficient to deny Reynolds' directed verdict motion.
Willingham v. State, 268 Ga. 64, 66 (485 S.E.2d 735) (1997)	Review of jury charges as a whole, including credibility instructions.	Supported the court's determination that the jury charge on expert witness credibility was adequate.
New v. State, 171 Ga. App. 392, 393 (319 S.E.2d 542) (1984)	Prior approval of jury charge language on expert witness credibility.	Reinforced that the jury charge given had been previously approved by the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed Reynolds' hearsay objection to the certificates of inspection for the breath testing device. It found that although Reynolds objected to hearsay generally, he never specifically objected to the foundation for admitting the certificates, thus waiving that objection under established precedent. Regarding the confrontation clause claim, the court relied on binding precedent that foreclosed such challenges to the admission of these certificates.

On the sufficiency of the evidence, the court concluded that the combination of the certified inspection certificates, the arresting officer's testimony confirming Reynolds was driving, and the breath test results showing a blood alcohol concentration of .145 shortly after driving, were sufficient to permit a jury to find Reynolds guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving with unlawful alcohol concentration.

Finally, the court rejected Reynolds' argument that the jury charge on expert witnesses was incomplete. It reasoned that the charge on witness credibility adequately covered the relevant concept, the charge had been previously approved by the court, and the argument was further undermined by the fact that no expert witnesses were called by either party.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

The court upheld Reynolds' convictions on all charges, affirming the trial court's rulings on evidentiary and jury instruction matters. This decision directly affects the parties by confirming the validity of the convictions and does not establish any new legal precedent beyond applying existing case law to the facts at hand.

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REYNOLDS v. THE STATE.

Judge Harold R. Banke.

John C. Reynolds was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with unlawful alcohol concentration, and failure to maintain lane.

After observing Reynolds' truck drifting outside his lane on an interstate highway, the arresting officer stopped Reynolds, who smelled strongly as though he had been drinking, slurred his speech, was flushed, had watery eyes, and admitted to having one drink. After conducting several field sobriety tests, the officer arrested Reynolds and took him to the station for a breath test which measured .145 and .149. Held:

1. We reject Reynolds' contention that the admission, pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-392 (f), of certificates showing the breath testing device was properly inspected, tested, and standardized violated the rule against hearsay. Reynolds maintains that the certificate lacked a proper foundation because the State failed to inquire whether it was in the regular course of business to make the record at the time of the act.

Although Reynolds asserted a hearsay objection to this evidence during a hearing on his motion in limine, the record shows that Reynolds never objected to the inadequacy of the foundation for this evidence. Reddin v. State, 223 Ga. App. 148, 152-153 (5) ( 476 S.E.2d 882) (1996). Therefore, the error was waived. See McGee v. State, 205 Ga. App. 722, 729 (12) ( 423 S.E.2d 666) (1992).

2. Reynolds' claim that the admission of the certificate of inspection violated his right to confrontation is foreclosed by Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 81 ( 485 S.E.2d 486) (1997).

3. The trial court properly denied Reynolds' motion for directed verdict on the charge of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol content. The certification of inspection, the officer's testimony that Reynolds had been driving, and the blood alcohol test results taken shortly thereafter showing a concentration of .145 were sufficient to allow the jury to find all the essential elements of the offense. OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); Carter v. State, 222 Ga. App. 397 (1) ( 474 S.E.2d 228) (1996) (the standard for reviewing the denial of a directed verdict of acquittal is the same as that for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence).

4. Reynolds maintains that the jury charge on expert witnesses was incomplete because it failed to state that the jury was not bound by the testimony, even if unopposed. The charge on credibility of witnesses adequately covered the concept at issue. Willingham v. State, 268 Ga. 64, 66 (5) ( 485 S.E.2d 735) (1997) (charge reviewed as a whole). Moreover, the charge given was previously approved by the court. New v. State, 171 Ga. App. 392, (5), 393 ( 319 S.E.2d 542) (1984). In any event, the fact that neither party called an expert undermines Reynolds' argument.

Judgment affirmed. Pope, P.J., and Johnson, J., concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 14, 1998 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED FEBRUARY 5, 1998 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.