There is no merit to defendant's argument that the trial level Louisiana court, through a strained exercise of its contempt power, did indirectly what it had no subject matter jurisdiction to do directly, namely, dissolve the subject Panamanian corporation, and that the Louisiana judgment in question is therefore not entitled to full faith and credit. Under the prior Louisiana appellate court order ( de Nunez v. Bartels, 684 So.2d 1008 [La], cert denied 689 So.2d 1379, 1380 [La]), which was the determinative factor on the prior appeal before this Court ( 241 A.D.2d 414), he and plaintiff were directed "to take the necessary legal steps, forthwith, to dissolve [the subject corporation] pursuant to the laws of the Republic of Panama" ( de Nunez v. Bartels, supra 684 So.2d, at 1014). Inasmuch as defendant does not contest that he refused to sign the agreements and corporate resolutions necessary to accomplish such a dissolution, the Louisiana trial level court was statutorily authorized to render a judgment directing a sheriff to do so on defendant's behalf ( see, La Code Civ Proc Annot arts 1878, 2504). Since defendant took a "devolutive" rather than "suspensive" appeal from that judgment, he is entitled to full faith and credit and present enforcement ( see, Fidelity Std. Life Ins. Co. v. First Natl. Bank Trust Co., 382 F. Supp. 956, 961-962, affd 510 F.2d 272, cert denied 423 U.S. 864).
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Nardelli, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.