Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court's Allen charge with respect to reasonable doubt was not error since it properly defined reasonable doubt as a doubt, based on the evidence or lack of evidence, for which a juror could express a reason if called upon to do so ( see, People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 252). Moreover, the charge as a whole was balanced, encouraging rather than coercive, and at no point did the court urge that a dissenting juror abandon his or her conviction to join in the opinion of others, attempt to shame the jurors into reaching a verdict, or endeavor to compel the jurors to agree upon a particular result ( see, People v. Pagan, 45 N.Y.2d 725; People v. Sims, 226 A.D.2d 564; People v. Kinard, 215 A.D.2d 591). Any alleged coercion in the charge did not result in a precipitous jury verdict since the record shows that the jury continued to deliberate for over three hours following the Allen charge before returning its verdict ( People v. Sims, supra; People v. Perdomo, 204 A.D.2d 358).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
Miller, J. P., Altman, Krausman and Luciano, JJ., concur.