We agree that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Octane Disclosure (15 U.S.C. § 2821-2824) in that the preemption clause ( 15 U.S.C. § 2824 [a]) bans any State "provision of law or regulation" that is not the same as the Federal provisions ( see, Pennzoil Co. v. Carlson, 158 A.D.2d 206, 219, lv dismissed 77 N.Y.2d 835). Were we not to find express preemption, we would find implied preemption, in that State standards setting stricter requirements for the posting of information regarding octane level "would unavoidably result in serious interference with the `accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress'" ( Guice v. Schwab Co., 89 N.Y.2d 31, 45, cert. denied 520 U.S. 1118). We have considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Rubin, Tom and Saxe, JJ.