The motion court correctly concluded that plaintiff did not have standing to prosecute a derivative action on behalf of the corporate defendant Loral Space and Communications Limited since the claims plaintiff sought to bring in a derivative capacity were not properly the claims of Loral Space but rather those of the Loral Corporation, an entity of which plaintiff is no longer a stockholder, her shares therein having been previously tendered for cash in the course of the Loral Corporation's merger with the Lockheed Corporation ( see, Business Corporation Law § 626 [b]; see also, Rubinstein v. Catacosinos, 91 A.D.2d 446, 446-447, affd for reasons stated 60 N.Y.2d 890). We note in addition that even if plaintiff had standing, the complaint would have been properly dismissed on the ground that the documentary evidence offered by defendants conclusively establishes that the Loral Corporation was contractually bound to make the payment to which plaintiff objects.
Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Nardelli, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.