Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
There is no merit to the defendant's claims that the court erred in determining that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making inculpatory statements. It is well settled that questions of credibility are primarily for the hearing court, and its determination is entitled to great deference on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record ( see, People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v. Rivera, 186 A.D.2d 692; People v. Bailey, 179 A.D.2d 662). Considering the "totality of the circumstances" ( People v. Ellis, 222 A.D.2d 519; People v. Schof, 136 A.D.2d 578), there is no basis for disturbing the hearing court's determination.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's sentence was neither illegal nor excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review, relate to matters dehors the record, or are without merit.
Ritter, J.P., Sullivan, Krausman and Luciano, JJ., concur.