Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contentions that the evidence of his intent to kill is legally insufficient to support the murder conviction (see, People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19; People v. Hryckewicz, 221 A.D.2d 990, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 849) and that County Court erred in permitting the prosecutor to inquire into uncharged crimes without the benefit of a Ventimiglia hearing (see, People v. Johnson, 233 A.D.2d 887, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1095). We decline to exercise our power to review those contentions as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see, CPL 470.15 [a]). We conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). The sentence imposed is not unduly harsh or severe.
Defendant's motion to vacate the conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, based upon the People's alleged failure to disclose evidence impacting adversely on the credibility of a prosecution witness, was properly denied (see, People v. Clausell, 182 A.D.2d 132, 135, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 761; People v. Alongi, 131 A.D.2d 767, 768). The record with respect to that motion fails to support defendant's allegation that the People entered into an agreement with the witness to induce him to testify (see, People v. Wilson, 237 A.D.2d 973, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866; People v. Orr, 190 A.D.2d 760, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 974; cf., People v. Steadman, 82 N.Y.2d 1). Further, the People satisfied their statutory obligation to disclose the record of judgment of conviction of that witness (see, CPL 240.45 [b]; People v. Wilson, supra). "A youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction for a crime" (CPL 720.35). Although defendant was entitled, for purposes of impeachment, to cross-examine that witness with respect to the acts underlying his youthful offender adjudication (see, People v. Scott, 134 Misc.2d 224, 226; see also, People v. Greer, 42 N.Y.2d 170, 176; People v. Cook, 37 N.Y.2d 591, 595), information concerning those underlying acts did not constitute Brady material. "Absent a connection to the crime charged, it was collateral and it was not otherwise the kind of material required by the courts to be supplied to defendant for use to impeach a witness (see, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150)" (People v. Battee, 122 A.D.2d 526, 527, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 749). Further, even if the People had an obligation to disclose that information, "constitutional error occurs only if the evidence which was not disclosed was material in the sense that `there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different' (United States v. Bagley, [supra, at 682]), plainly not the case here" (People v. Chin, 67 N.Y.2d 22, 33).