Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35) and two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.65). The verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not contrary to the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).
County Court did not err in modifying its Sandoval ruling. The court initially properly allowed cross-examination of defendant with respect to his use of an alias (see, People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455, 461-462), and, when defendant thereafter testified falsely regarding use of the alias, the court properly modified its Sandoval ruling to allow questioning concerning that false testimony (see, People v. Hunter, 235 A.D.2d 378, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1094; see also, People v. Blakeney, 88 N.Y.2d 1011; People v. Mayea, 226 A.D.2d 280, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 1022).
We reject the contention that defendant was denied his right to be present during a conference in chambers. The record establishes that, during that conference, the court directed defense counsel to submit a written application to the court before cross-examining the victim about her prior sexual conduct. Because the conference in chambers involved only a procedural matter, defendant failed to establish that he was denied the right to be present at a material stage of the proceedings (see, People v. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d 469, 472). Further, the court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine the victim about her prior sexual conduct. Defendant failed to establish a proper foundation for such questioning (see, People v. Halbert, 175 A.D.2d 88, affd 80 N.Y.2d 865, cert denied 507 U.S. 922).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contentions that the court improperly permitted opinion testimony by a physician's assistant that the victim's vaginal injury resulted from nonconsensual sexual activity and that his conviction of rape and sexual abuse is inconsistent with his acquittal of kidnaping in the second degree (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985, 987; People v. Gonzalez, 239 A.D.2d 931, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 893). In any event, those contentions lack merit.
Finally, we reject the contention that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. "[T]he evidence, the law, and the circumstances of [this] case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation," establish that defense counsel provided meaningful representation (People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147).