Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by the complainant's blurting out of prior bad acts evidence contrary to the court's prior ruling excluding such evidence. The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant's application for a mistrial (see, People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995), because "the statement was cut off in midstream by the court's prompt intercession, minimizing any prejudicial effect it might have" (People v. Blackshear, 112 A.D.2d 1044, 1045), and because the testimony was stricken and, in both the preliminary and final charge, the court directed the jury to disregard stricken testimony; an instruction the jury is presumed to have followed (see, People v. Roman, 210 A.D.2d 45, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 1037). We note that defendant refused the court's offer of further curative instructions.
We reject defendant's argument that his conviction on the count of tampering with a witness (Penal Law § 215.11) relating to a December 28, 1993 telephone call was against the weight of the evidence. In assessing whether the statement constituted an attempt to instill fear, the jury was entitled to draw inferences based on the surrounding events, including subsequent threats made by defendant (see, People v. Ingram, 71 N.Y.2d 474).
Concur — Lerner, P. J., Nardelli, Wallach, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.