Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In a proper exercise of its discretion, the court applied the Child Support Standards Act (Domestic Relations Law § 240) in determining a proper award on this pendente lite application ( see, e.g., Asteinza v. Asteinza, 173 A.D.2d 515, 516; Rizzo v. Rizzo, 163 A.D.2d 15). Moreover, it took note of the "disparity in gross incomes" earned by the parties when it directed the husband to pay the mortgage and equity loans on the marital residence in addition to his basic support obligation ( see, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 186 A.D.2d 245, 247; Chasm v. Chasm, 182 A.D.2d 862; Lenigan v. Lenigan, 159 A.D.2d 108). Finally, the court subtracted the carrying charges on the marital residence from the husband's gross income before applying the statutory formula to arrive at his proper measure of child support ( see, e.g., Krantz v. Krantz, 175 A.D.2d 865; see also, Ryan v. Ryan, supra; Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [b] [3] [ii]).
The husband has not demonstrated that the pendente lite award complained of has left him unable to meet his own financial obligations ( cf., e.g., Young v. Young, 245 A.D.2d 560; Polychronopoulos v. Polychronopoulos, 226 A.D.2d 354). Rather, the court's assessment represents an adequate accommodation between the reasonable needs of both parties ( see, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, supra; Polito v. Polito, 168 A.D.2d 440; Shapiro v. Shapiro, 163 A.D.2d 294). Any inequities perceived by the husband can best be remedied by a speedy trial ( see, e.g., Wallach v. Wallach, 236 A.D.2d 604; Beige v. Beige, 220 A.D.2d 636).
The husband's remaining contentions are without merit.
Miller, J. P., O'Brien, Pizzuto and Friedmann, JJ., concur.